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Abstract
We analyze and confirm the existence and extent of rational informational
herding and rational informational contrarianism in a financial market exper-
iment, and compare and contrast these with equivalent irrational phenomena.
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Traders who should herd or be contrarian in theory are the significant sources
of both within the data. Correcting for subjects who can be identified as
less rational increases our ability to predict herding or contrarian behavior
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During the 2008 Financial Crisis stock markets displayed extraordinary fluctuations.
From September to mid-November 2008, there were eight days when the Dow Jones
Industrial Average changed by more than 5% in absolute terms (from close to close).
From World War II to 2008 there were only sixteen other days when the day-to-day
change exceeded 5% in absolute value. Moreover, although we perceive the time of the
2008 crisis as a time of market decline, there were two days when the Dow rose by more
than 10%. Intra-day fluctuations were even more pronounced: on fourteen days the
maximum and minimum prices levels between two days were more than 10% apart.
Such extreme price fluctuations are possible only if there are dramatic changes in
behavior (from buying to selling or the reverse). Such behavior and the resulting price
volatility is often claimed to be inconsistent with rational trading and informationally
efficient prices. Commentators invariably attribute dramatic swings to investors “animal
instincts”, which to most economists, is deeply unsatisfying. Work by Park and Sabourian
(2011), however, provides a theoretical insight showing that switching behavior can be
fully rational even with efficient prices and also provides a framework that admits both
rational herding and rational contrarian behavior. The nature of information in real
financial markets is often complex: a nice feature of Park and Sabourian (2011) is to allow
traders to receive signals that are non-monotonic. For instance, a trader may receive a
signal suggesting that an upward move in prices or a downward move in prices are more
likely than prices remaining the same (what we define in the theory section below as a
“hill-shaped signal”) or alternatively a signal may indicate that prices are likely to stay the
same but might fall or rise with positive probability (a“U-shaped signal”). The theoretical
results vary according to the private signals received by traders. The key hidden parameter
that defines informational herding theory is the private information held by traders. Such
information is unobservable in the real world which makes it difficult to impossible to test
any herding theory with, say, transaction level financial data. In a laboratory setting,
however, one can control private information and examine directly how behavior changes
with private information. Since our primary objective is to provide an empirical test of
this theory, we therefore base our work upon a series of lab experiments, which is also
one of the largest yet to examine rational herding with around 1350 trades across six
separate treatments.
To appreciate our results and our contribution it is important to understand how
our findings relate to the literature. Avery and Zemsky (1998) show theoretically that
herding cannot arise if there are only two liquidation values. Experimental research by
Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005) confirmed
this result: herding does not arise with two liquidation values. One can interpret their
findings as showing that people do not exhibit a natural tendency to herd. Instead, they
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also found that subjects tended to (irrationally) act against the crowd, i.e. to behave as
contrarians. This natural tendency to be a contrarian may bias behavior against rational
herding and may also overwhelm rational motivations to be a contrarian: disentangling
these two possibilities requires a notion of rational contrarianism which is an important
feature of our model.
In our work, the overall fit of the data to the theoretical model is roughly 75%. This
figure is in line with the results in Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani
and Guarino (2005), both of which test simpler models of (no-)herd behavior.1 Broken
down by player type, these numbers are 79% for the recipients of signals with monotonic
likelihood functions,2 65% for recipients of “hill-shaped signals”, and 45% for recipients
of “U-shaped signals”.
Considering the results on irrational contrarianism in the literature, it is not too
surprising that our results on herding are mixed: we observe that herding arises less often
than predicted by the theory (in only about 30% of the predicted cases). Our results on
rational contrarianism are stronger: it arises in about 77% of the predicted cases.
Given these findings, it is important to understand whether the underlying information
model has predictive power. To this end we analyze whether receiving a U or hill-shaped
signal affects the chance of acting as a herder and contrarian significantly relative to
any other signal. We find that this is indeed the case. Compared to receiving any
other signal, recipients of U-shaped signals are significantly more likely to herd (by 8%).
This indicates that while the contrarian tendency of traders is strong enough to prevent
some of the herding that should arise, U-shaped signals are still the relevant source of
herding. Next, if contrarianism arises, it is most likely to be caused by someone with
contrarian information; receiving a hill-shaped signal increases the probability of acting
as a contrarian by 50% relative to receiving any other signal.
The decision problem of herding candidates is most difficult. We thus ask whether
those that act more rationally are more likely to act according to the theory. Being less
rational is determined by a simple test: the decision not to trade is never rational in our
model. Thus, one can argue that the subjects who decide not to trade at some point in
the experiment are less rational than those who choose to always trade. When splitting
the subjects into two pools according to this simple rationality test (the first pool contains
all subjects who never choose to pass, the second contains all subjects who choose to pass
in at least one treatment), we observe that the the marginal effect of receiving a U-shaped
1To qualify this, both of these papers consider only two types of agent which are equivalent to the low
and high signal type in our experiment.
2Two treatments had only monotonic likelihood functions, with one signal being “weaker” than an-
other. Recipients of the weaker signals generally act less frequently in accordance with the theory; see
Table 1.
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signal on the chance of herding is significantly stronger for the more rational subjects.
Overview. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section re-
views the experimental literature on financial market herding. Section 2 examines the
theoretical framework, discusses the modifications undertaken to better fit a laboratory
experiment, and outlines the hypotheses we seek to evaluate. Section 3 describes the ex-
perimental design, the subject pool, and the various treatments. Section 4 describes the
overall fit of our data to the theoretical model. Section 5 looks in detail at herding and
contrarianism. Section 6 studies the behavior of monotonic signal types and also looks
at the relationship between prices and trading decisions. Section 7 studies whether there
are differences in behavior with respect to herding and contrarianism between more and
less rational types. Section 8 provides a brief discussion of some alternative theories, the
examination of which is confined to the Appendix. Section 9 summarizes the key findings
and concludes. The Appendix contains proofs, the detailed discussion of alternative be-
havioral explanations for our findings, as well as the subject instructions, an experimental
timeline and screenshots.
1 Experimental Work on Financial Market Herding
Several papers have examined informational herding behavior in experimental settings;
only a few employ efficient prices and none studies rational contrarianism.3 The first
published experiment to test herding was Anderson and Holt (1997), albeit in a setting
without moving prices. They found that herding did occur, but at lower levels than
predicted by the theory (73%), which they justified in terms of assumed errors made by
predecessor decisions. Following Anderson and Holt, many experiments since have not
specifically considered a financial market setting and have implicitly held prices fixed.4
There are however a number of important studies that have considered moving prices
such as Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005), dis-
cussed earlier, and Cipriani and Guarino (2009). The latter tested the model presented in
Avery and Zemsky (1998) with so-called ‘event uncertainty’ in the lab, enlisting financial
professionals.5 They find a degree of rational herding in line with our own results, which
3An interesting alternative is provided by Boortz, Jurkatis, Kremer, and Nautz (2013) who analyze a
computer simulation of a model based on Park and Sabourian (2011). Their findings generally support the
model though they argue that herd behavior during the 2008 financial crisis was not entirely explainable
by the model alone.
4A more recent contribution using a setting without moving prices is Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007),
who used professional Chicago Board of Trade traders as their subjects.
5More recently Cipriani and Guarino (2014) provide estimation tools for real transaction level data
in a setting based on the theoretical model of Avery and Zemsky (1998). For the one particular NYSE
stock in 1995 that they use as an example, they argue that herd activity accounts for about 4% of the
price movements.
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suggests that our student subject pool does not distort the results. Using a larger subject
pool, we complement their work by studying rational contrarianism and by obtaining re-
sults on the impact of information structures on herding and contrarianism. There is a
wealth of research in the empirical finance literature that stresses the role of contrarian
tendencies in real-world data (e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)). Prior ex-
perimental research may have given the impression that these contrarian tendencies are
irrational; our findings here suggest instead that this not necessarily the case.
There also exists an older experimental literature on information aggregation in fi-
nancial markets (for instance, Plott and Sunder (1988)). Work in this area studies the
capacity of prices to aggregate information and to reveal the true state. One important
component of these studies is the speed at which traders with either overlapping or hier-
archical information learn from each other. We complement this line of work by studying
situations without overlapping or hierarchical information and without fully informed par-
ties; in our setup, in finite time, no trader in the market will be able to learn the value of
the state. Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) identify the large extent to which
subjects tend to overestimate the precision of their information. In our framework, such
overestimating tendencies would weaken herding instincts and reinforce contrarianism.
Finally, we also carried out a similar experimental analysis in Park and Sgroi (2012) in
which we allow subjects to decide when to trade rather than limiting them to an exogenous
sequence. This has the advantage of adding realism, but the significant disadvantage of
not having a theoretical basis on which to judge the rationality of individual subjects. 6
2 Definitions, Theoretical Results, and Predictions
This section provides a simplified variation of the theory in Park and Sabourian (2011)
to provide theoretical predictions and thus guide our experimental design.
2.1 An Illustrative Example
MC, the main competitor of a financial institution, FI, has just declared bankruptcy.
This may be good for FI because they may be able to attract the MC’s customers. If
this situation materializes, a share of FI is worth V h. MC’s failure may also be bad
since FI may have made the same mistakes as MC; a share of FI is then worth V l < V h.
We are interested in the behavior of a privately informed investor, who received a (noisy)
signal S and who observes several sales. Sales, loosely, convey that the sellers had negative
6Shachat and Srinivasan (2011) also allow experimental subjects to trade when they wish, and more-
over allow greater flexibility in the number of trades (Park and Sgroi (2012) allow at most two trades per
subject).
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information. We ask: is it possible that a trader sells, even though his private (noisy)
signal alone tells him that FI is worth V h?
Suppose that the price p ∈ (V l, V h) is fixed. Then the answer is yes: for sufficiently
many sales, the private information of any trader is swamped by the negative information
derived from observing that early sells, E[V |S,many sales] < p, even if the private signal
favored state V h, Pr(S|V h) > Pr(S|V l).
There is, of course, a major shortcoming to this argument: the price of a financial
asset is not fixed. If, as is common in financial market models, the price would be
such that p = E[V |information contained in all past trades], then we would predict that
for all past trading activity E[V |S] ≷ p if and only if Pr(S|V h) ≷ Pr(S|V l). In other
words, someone with favorable information would never sell; see Avery and Zemsky (1998).
Experimental evidence has confirmed this finding; see Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider
(2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005).
More recent theoretical research, Park and Sabourian (2011), has found, however,
that as we admit more complexity in the form of additional states, it is possible to
identify situations when traders act against their information. The ideas behind Park and
Sabourian are best explained by extending upon the above example. Namely, suppose
that there is a third outcome, one in which FI is unaffected by MC’s failure, associated
with value V m with V l < V m < V h. Assume all outcomes are equally likely. We are
now interested in the behavior of a privately informed investor, who received a signal S,
after a good public announcement G and a bad public announcement B. The information
content of G is such that the worst state can be ruled out, Pr(V l|G) = 0, that of B is
that the best state can be ruled out, Pr(V h|B) = 0. Compared to the situation when all
outcomes are equally likely, prices will be higher after G and lower after B.
If an investors buys, his expectation must exceed the expectation of the market, and
if he sells, his expectation must be below that of the market. Both G and B elimi-
nate one state, so that, after each announcement arguments from two-state setups ap-
ply. For instance, after good news G, an investors buys if he thinks, relative to the
market, that it is more likely that FI will thrive than be unaffected. Mathematically,
E[V |G] ≶ E[V |S,G] is equivalent to Pr(S|V m) ≶ Pr(S|V h) and E[V |S,B] ≶ E[V |B] is
equivalent to Pr(S|V m) ≶ Pr(S|V l). Thus a privately informed investor buying after G
and selling after B is equivalent to Pr(S|V l) > Pr(S|V m) and Pr(S|V h) > Pr(S|V m).
Conversely, a privately informed investor selling after G and buying after B is equivalent
to Pr(S|V l) < Pr(S|V m) and Pr(S|V h) < Pr(S|V m).
In words, an investor sells after B and buys after G, if and only if, compared to the
market, his private information is such that he puts more weight on the extreme outcomes,
failing and thriving, and less on the middle one, being unaffected. Such a type has U-
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shaped information and, loosely, herds in the sense that he acts like a momentum trader,
buying with rising and selling with falling prices. Similarly, an investor buys after B and
sells after G, if and only if, he puts less weight on the extreme outcomes and more on
the middle one compared to the market. Such a type has hill-shaped information and,
loosely, trades contrary to the general movement of prices.7
There are several points to note about this example. First, the public announce-
ments G and B are degenerate as they each exclude one of the extreme states. Yet the
same kind of reasoning holds if we replace G by an announcement that attaches arbitrar-
ily small probability to the worst outcome, V l, and if we replace B by an announcement
that attaches arbitrarily small probability to the best outcome, V h. Second, in the above
illustration, G and B are exogenous public signals. In the security model underlying our
experiment, on the other hand, public information is created endogenously by the history
of publicly observable transactions. Yet the intuition behind the results is similar to the
above illustration in that, for instance, after a history of many buys, state V l can be
almost ruled out (as after announcement G). The underlying model is thus self-contained
in that public signals are generated endogenously by trading. Switching behavior is trig-
gered by observational learning, which is a core feature of informational herding, and from
this perspective it is thus justified to label switching with the crowd as “herding”.
The theoretical model underlying our experiment mimics the above example with three
states, three signals, and three possible trading actions (buy, no trade, sell). It is based
upon a standard sequential trading setup in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
in which risk-neutral subjects trade single units of a financial security with a competitive
market maker, arriving at the market in a predetermined, exogenous sequence. Past
trades and prices are public information, and the market maker adjusts the price after
each transaction to include the new information revealed by this trade.
Rational subjects should buy if their expectation, conditional on their private signal
and all public information, is above the price and sell if it is below. As in Park and
Sabourian (2011), with three states, there are three key types of likelihood functions
(henceforth LF) for signals: monotonic, hill-shaped and U-shaped. Recipients of a signal
with an increasing LF will always buy, those with a decreasing LF will always sell. As
in the above example, loosely, recipients of a signal with a hill-shaped LF will buy if
prices fall a lot and sell if prices rise a lot (they “buck the trend” and act as contrarians).
Finally, recipients of U-shaped LFs will buy if prices rise a lot but sell if prices fall a lot
(they “follow the trend”).
7In our formal definition of herding and contrarianism, we benchmark behavior against the decision
that the trader would take at the initial history, but the switching mechanism is akin to what we
describe here.
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2.2 Formal Definition of Herding
The illustrative example examined above is perhaps enough to motivate the experiment
performed in this paper, but it may also be useful to provide a more formal description
of the theory which must begin with a formal definition of herding.
The general movement of prices captures the majority or ‘crowd’ action: rising prices
indicate that there are more buyers than sellers, falling prices indicate that there are
more sellers than buyers. We will define herding and contrarianism against this yardstick.
Moreover, the benchmark decision for a herder or contrarian is the action that they
would take without observing any of the prices. We thus say that a trader engages in
herding behavior if he switches from selling to buying in the face of rising prices, or if he
switches from buying to selling in the face of falling prices. The counterpart situation,
contrarianism, arises when a trader switches from selling to buying in the face of falling
prices or if he switches from buying to selling in the face of rising prices. For the formal
definition we use Ht for the trading history at time t; this history includes all past actions,
their timing, and the transaction prices; H1 is the initial history.
Definition (Herding and Contrarianism)
Herding. A trader engages in herd-buying in period t after history Ht if and only if (i) his
expectation is below the market expectation at the initial history, (ii) he buys at history
Ht, and (iii− h) prices at Ht are higher than at H1. Sell herding is defined analogously.
Contrarianism. A trader is a buy contrarian in period t after history Ht if and only
if (i) his expectation is below the market expectation at the initial history, (ii) he buys at
history Ht, and (iii−c) prices at Ht are lower than at H1. Contrarian selling is analogous.
Both with buy herding and buy contrarianism, a trader prefers to sell before observ-
ing other traders’ actions (condition (i)), but prefers to buy after observing the history
Ht (condition (ii)). The key differences between herding and contrarianism are condi-
tions (iii-h) and (iii-c): the former ensures that the change of action from selling to
buying is with the general movement of the crowd. The latter condition requires the price
to have dropped so that a buyer acts against the movement of prices. Thus there is a
symmetry in the definitions, making herding the intuitive counterpart to contrarianism.
These definitions also capture well-documented financial market trading behavior. The
herding definition is a formalization of the idea of rational momentum trading. Contrar-
ianism has a mean-reversion flavor. Both momentum and contrarian trading have been
analyzed extensively in the empirical literature and have been found to generate abnor-
mal returns over some time horizon.8 Our analysis provides evidence for momentum and
mean reversion behavior in an environment where such behavior can be rational.
8In the empirical literature, contrarian behavior is found to be profitable in the very short run (1
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In the literature, there are other definitions of herding (and informational cascades).
The definitions of herding and contrarianism that we adopt here are analogous to those
in Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011) (which we implement),
and capture the social learning (learning from others), imitative aspect of behavior for
individual traders that is implied by the notion of herding from the earlier literature.9
2.3 The Underlying Theory
The model that underlies our experiment is an adaptation of a Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) style sequential trading model in the following way. There is a single security that
takes one of three possible liquidation values, V1 < V2 < V3, each equally likely. Traders
arrive in a random sequence and trade a security with an uninformed market maker.
Before meeting a trader, the market maker sets a single price at which he is willing to
buy or sell one unit of the security. Every trading slot is designated to a noise trader
with a fixed probability (25% in our experimental setting) who buys or sells with equal
chance. Noise traders play an important role in generating uncertainty: for example the
second trader to act is never certain of the motivation of the first trader. This exogenously
generated uncertainty can also play a role in making herding or contrarianism more likely
through an unusual sequence of noise trades and so captures the idea that exogenous
noise can kick-start a herd. The remaining traders are informed and receive one of three
signals, S1, S2, S3.
All past prices are public information. The market maker follows a simple pricing rule
by setting the unique trading price as the expectation of the true value of the security,
conditional on all publicly available past information. Since the entry order is exogenous
and since traders can act only once, they face an inherently static decision. They thus
buy if their expectation conditional on their private signal and on the information derived
from past trades exceeds the price, and they sell if this expectation is below the price. In
the setting used in this experiment, a buy increases the price, a sale decreases the price.
Traders can thus perfectly infer past actions from prices and they can compute every
type’s optimal action at any point in the past.10
week and 1 month, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990)) and in the very long run (3-5 years, Bondt
and Thaler (1985))). Momentum trading is found to be profitable over the medium term (3-12 months,
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) and exceptionally unprofitable beyond that (the 24 months following the
first 12, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)). Sadka (2006) studies the effect of systematic liquidity risk on
returns to momentum trading and links one of the liquidity risk components to informed trading.
9Specifically, we follow Brunnermeier (2001)’s (Ch. 5) description of herding as a situation in which
“an agent imitates the decision of his predecessor even though his own signal might advise him to take a
different action” and we consider the behavior of a particular signal type by looking at how the history
of past trading can induce a trader to change behavior and trade against his private signal.
10To asses traders’ actions as rational or irrational, it is thus unimportant how exactly prices are
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The following are the possible shapes of likelihood functions (LF):
increasing : Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2) < Pr(S|V3); decreasing : Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V3);
U − shaped : Pr(S|Vi) > Pr(S|V2) for i = 1, 3; Hill − shaped : Pr(S|Vi) < Pr(S|V2) for i = 1, 3.
For the results in our paper it is also important whether the likelihood of a signal is
higher in one of the extreme states V1 or V3 relative to the other extreme state. We thus
define the bias of a signal S as Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V1). A U-shaped LF with a negative bias,
Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V1) < 0, will be labeled as an nU-shaped LF and a pU-shaped LF with a
positive bias, Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V1) > 0, will be labeled as a pU-shaped LF. Similarly, we
use nHill (pHill) to describe a hill-shaped LF with a negative (positive) bias.11 A signal
is called monotonic if its LF is either increasing or decreasing and non-monotonic if its
LF is hill or U-shaped.
In all treatments, signal S1 is decreasing, signal S3 is increasing. This implies that
the recipient of signal S1 shifts probability weight towards the lowest state (S1 is “bad
news”), whereas the recipient of S3 shifts weight towards the highest state (S3 is “good
news”). Signal S2 varies by treatment and we will study settings with all possible shapes.
The following is a corollary to Theorem 1 in Park and Sabourian (2011) and it for-
malizes the ideas conferred in the illustrative example above. The proof is in appendix.
(“S herds” is to be read as “S herds with positive probability”.)
Theorem (Herding and Contrarian Behavior (Park and Sabourian (2011)))
(a) A signal type with a decreasing LF always sells.
(b) A signal type with an increasing LF always buys.
(c) A signal type buy- (sell-) herds if and only if his LF is negative (positive) U-shaped.
(d) A signal type acts as a buy-(sell-) contrarian if and only if his LF is negative
(positive) hill-shaped.
Adjustments for the Experiment. The full underlying theory in Avery and Zemsky
(1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011) has two prices: one at which the market maker
buys (the bid) and one at which the market maker sells (the ask). We dispense with bid-
and ask-prices and focus instead on a single trading price, as is standard in the related
experimental literature. With only a single price, the necessary conditions from Park
and Sabourian (2011) for herding and contrarianism are also sufficient. While using bid-
and ask-prices may seem to provide a better fit with the underlying theory, their use
would generate a host of complications. Most obviously, participants need to understand
computed: all that is needed is that traders can correctly infer past actions. Thus it suffices if prices
increase for a buy and decrease for a sale.
11The more compact nU/nHill notation is used in the proof of Theorem 1 found in the appendix. In
the main text we will stick with the term “negative U-shape” or similar.
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the difference between the two prices. Moreover, it may lead to people focusing (sub-
consciously even) on only one side of the market. Thus people with initially negative
information may follow only the movement of the bid-price, disregarding the possibility
of buying completely. As Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and Drehmann, Oechssler, and
Roider (2005) highlight, bid-ask treatments usually offer no additional insights.
2.4 Theoretical Predictions for the Experiment
Under rationality, traders should buy if their conditional expectation exceeds the price and
sell otherwise. Traders can also choose not to trade. Such a ‘pass’ could only be optimal
when the price to buy (the ‘ask’) differs from the price to sell (the ‘bid’) and when the
expectation of a subject is between these two prices. In a setup without a bid-ask-spread
as in our experiment, however, such a situation cannot arise (but for degenerate cases
when the expectation coincides with the price). Thus we have
Hypothesis 1 (No passes) Subjects will never pass.
Given the proximity of the design to the theoretical model, further signal-specific
predictions arise immediately: (1) signal types with a decreasing LF (such as S1) always
sell; (2) signal types with a increasing LF (such as S3) always buy; (3) the behavior of
signal types with a non-monotonic LF (hill or U shape) will depend on the trading history.
In the experiment we know the outcomes of the random elements (noise trades, the
exogenous ordering and the signals for each subject). Thus, conditional on all other
subjects behaving in accordance with the theory, we can calculate the action that each
subject should undertake given history Ht and signal S.
Hypothesis 2 (Adherence to the Theory) Subjects will act as prescribed by the the-
ory: they buy if their theoretic expectation, conditional on their signal and the trading
history, exceeds the price, and they sell otherwise.
The experiment is implemented using a computerized price setting rule that assumes
that subjects act in accordance with Hypothesis 2. For instance, in a setting with a
negative U-shaped signal S2 and absent herding, a buy would have been assumed to come
from either a noise trader or an informed trader with good news, S3. Likewise, in a setting
with a positive U-shaped signal S2 and absent herding, a buy would have been assumed to
come from either a noise trader, an informed trader with good news S3, or and informed
trader with the positive U-shaped signal S2.
12 No-trades in our setting do not affect the
12Although even ex ante it is foreseeable that some subjects do not act according to the theory, any
other pricing rule would require that the underlying algorithm either uses “inside, non-public information”
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price, which is synonymous to a no-trade not revealing information. From the lack of
a price-movement, subjects can thus infer that there was a no-trade. Using any other
updating rule would have required us to speculate ex ante that a particular type is more
prone to not trading than another.
One particular focus of this study is to test for and understand herding and contrarian
behavior. The theory here predicts that types with U and hill-shaped signals may exhibit
such behavior.
Hypothesis 3 (Rational Herding and Contrarianism)
Contrarianism: Subjects who receive a signal with a negative (positive) hill-shaped
LF will act as buy (sell) contrarians when the theory predicts and sell (buy) otherwise.
Specifically, they may act as buy (sell) contrarians when prices fall (rise), and they sell
(buy) whenever prices rise (fall).
Herding: Subjects who receive a signal with a negative (positive) U-shaped LF will act as
buy (sell) herders when the theory predicts and sell (buy) otherwise; specifically, they may
buy (sell) herd when the price rises (falls), but sell (buy) whenever the price falls (rises).
Monotonic types cannot rationally herd because their expectation will always be either
below or above the price and cannot switch. However, traders with monotonic and hill-
shaped signals can herd in the sense of our definition, and those with monotonic and
U-shaped signals can act as contrarians. What is required is that prices fall for buy
contrarian behavior and sell herding and that prices rise for buy herding and sell contrarian
behavior.
In an experiment we do not anticipate a precise mapping of the theory to observed
behavior and we shall compare the fit of the theory with that found in the literature (e.g.
Anderson and Holt (1997), Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005), or Cipriani and
Guarino (2005)).
The decision problem in particular for U and hill-shaped types is much more difficult
than for any other type as they must change behavior, and it would almost be surprising
if they always do this correctly. A weaker but equally important test of our theory is thus
whether receiving a U or hill-shaped signal increases the chance that one acts as a herder
and contrarian respectively. For if so, we have evidence that the theory has relevance in
(such as the signal) or that it speculates on a particular bias that subjects may exhibit. Our mechanical
price setting rule should thus be seen as the unique “rational” yardstick against which we measure
behavior and it ensures that rational herding and contrarianism can only occur for U and hill-shaped types
respectively. As explained above, the precise price-setting rule is not essential for assessing rationality:
all that is needed is that the price increases after buys and decreases after sales so that subjects can infer
past actions (which is important so that they can update correctly). In section 8 and in the appendix we
also explore whether alternative updating rules, which may include accounting for others’ irrationality,
may do a better job at explaining the data.
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the sense that the right signals affect behavior in a significant manner. Hypothesis 4 is
thus the most important test as it tests whether the role attributed to underlying signals
by the theory is justified.
Hypothesis 4 (The Impact of Signals on Herding and Contrarian Behavior)
Receiving a U-shaped signal significantly increases the chance of acting as a herder com-
pared to receiving any other type of information. Receiving a hill-shaped signal signifi-
cantly increases the chance of acting as a contrarian compared to receiving any other type
of information.
Prior experimental work by Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani
and Guarino (2005) has identified that traders exhibit a “natural” tendency to act as
contrarians. Traders in these papers had the equivalent of monotonic signals. Anticipating
that we may observe some irrational decisions among the monotonic signal types, we shall
strive to understand their behavior better. If they tend to act as contrarians, then as
prices rise, traders with an increasing LF sell, and, likewise, as prices fall traders with
a decreasing LF buy. If instead they tend to act as herders, then as prices rise, traders
with an decreasing LF buy, and, likewise, as prices fall traders with a increasing LF sell.
Either type of behavior contradicts the theory.
Hypothesis 5 (Price Impact) Price changes do not affect the decisions of monotonic
signal types.
3 Experimental Design
In addition to the information given in what follows, the appendix contains a time-line of
events, the instructions and materials given to subjects, and a description of the purpose-
built software used in this experiment.
3.1 Overview
The financial asset in every treatment can take one of three possible liquidation values
V ∈ {75, 100, 125} which correspond to the true value of the asset. The traders were
typically made up of 15-25 experimental subjects, plus a further 25% noise traders, with
a central computer acting as the market maker. Noise traders play an important role in the
theory and add only a mild degree of extra complexity to the experimental design. They
also have a useful practical role in the experiment, simulating a degree of uncertainty about
the usefulness of any observed actions. Generally, noise traders reduce the informativeness
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of any observed action and in the appendix we analyze how a model of errors as an
incorrect assessment of the degree of noise trading performs given our data. The existence
and proportion of noise traders was made known to the experimental subjects in advance.
It was also mentioned that noise traders randomized 50:50 between buying and selling.
Prior to each treatment subjects were provided with an information sheet detailing
the prior probability of each state, a list of what each possible signal would imply for the
probability of each state, and the likelihood of each signal being drawn given the state.13
We thus provided subjects with both the signal distribution and the initial posterior
distribution for each signal. The information on the sheets was common knowledge to
all subjects. After being given the opportunity to study this information, each subject i
received an informative private signal, described to them as a “broker’s tip”, Si ∈ S ≡
{S1, S2, S3}. The subjects were not told anything about the implications of non-monotonic
or monotonic information structures or the predictions of the theory.
The nature of the compensation system was also made clear in advance, and in partic-
ular that it directly implied that they should attempt to make the highest possible virtual
profit in each round, since the final compensation was based on overall performance (up
to C$30) combined with a one-off participation fee (C$15; equivalent amounts were paid
in the UK at the current exchange rate).
Prior to the start of trading, subjects were allocated time with pen and paper to
contemplate their own signal and their information about the signal distribution and
the prior probabilities that the asset value was high, medium or low.14 When trading
began, trades in each treatment were organized sequentially: each subject or noise trader
was assigned a time interval in which they, and only they, could act.15 In practice,
subjects tended to act before the allotted time was over with very few timeouts. A
sequence of trading opportunities t = 1, 2, 3, . . . produced a history of actions and prices,
Ht = {(a1, P1), . . . , (at−1, Pt−1)} with H1 = ∅. During the experiment itself, trading
was anonymous and all price movements were clearly visible in real time on the computer
screen. Specifically, subjects were shown the history in the form of a continuously updating
price chart, and the screen also listed the current price, Pt, with P1 = 100.
Subjects were told that they had three possible actions a ∈ {sell, pass, buy} that they
13For examples of such sheets please see the appendix.
14The subjects could use the pen and paper as they wished, for example, to make notes or calculations.
In the post-experimental questionnaire detailed below around 24% of subjects reported that they carried
out numerical calculations.
15Subjects were called upon to act by a clearly visible notification on their computer screen. The
combination of time in advance of trading (after signals were revealed) and a limited time window of
action during trading was designed to match the theoretical model and to capture the spirit of real-world
time-limited trading opportunities. It also dealt with the practical time limitations of the experimental
sessions.
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could undertake in their trading opportunity time window, t∗. They were also told that
the time of their opportunity was exogenous, randomly determined and unique to them.
It was stressed to the subjects that their virtual profits per treatment were generated
based on the difference between the price at which they traded, Pt∗ where t
∗ is the time
of their personal trading opportunity, and the true value of the share, V . It was also
emphasized that the price that prevails at the end of trading does not affect their payoff
(unless this was the price at which they traded).
The subjects were recruited from the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge and Warwick.
No one was allowed to participate twice. We ran 13 sessions: 3 at the University of
Cambridge (13 subjects each), 6 at the University of Warwick (18, 19, 22, 22, 22, and 25
subjects) and 4 at the University of Toronto (17, 18, 13, and 13 subjects).16 We collected
demographic data for the Warwick sessions: of the subjects there, around 49% were
female, around 73% were studying (or had taken) degrees in Economics, Finance, Business,
Statistics, Management or Mathematics. 53% claimed to have some prior experience with
financial markets, with some 23% owning shares at some point in the past.
3.2 Treatments
Following Section 2, the rational action for recipients of signals S1 and decreasing S2 is to
sell and for S3 and increasing S2 is to buy, irrespective of Ht. For the recipients of non-
monotonic S2 signals the nature of Ht and the precise information structure determined a
unique optimal action. This action might be to herd or to act in a contrarian manner. The
treatments were each designed to enable us to examine a specific information structure
with respect to signal S2, specified as follows:
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Treatment 1: negative hill-shaped signal structure making buy-contrarianism possible;
Treatment 2: increasing signal structure ruling out herding or contrarianism;
Treatment 3: negative U-shaped signal structure making buy-herding possible;
Treatment 4: decreasing signal structure ruling out herding or contrarianism;
Treatment 5: positive U-shaped signal structure making sell-herding possible;
Treatment 6: negative hill-shaped signal structure making buy-contrarianism possible.
There was also a training treatment, during which the subjects could practise using
the software. This round was not part of the payment calculations, or the results.
16In the tabulated regressions we correct for possible within-session correlations by clustering the
standard errors at the session level. In untabulated regressions we further checked for the effect of
different number of subjects in the sessions by (a) using fixed effects for the sessions and (b) using the
number of participants as a control. The results were robust with either approach.
17Note that we employed two negative hill-shaped treatments. In the first, Treatment 1, by design there
were more candidates for buying, in the second, Treatment 6, there were more candidates for selling. The
purpose of this design was to see if hill-shaped types might be irrationally prone to herd behavior.
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4 Analysis of the Rational Benchmark
In the numbers to follow we report only trades by human subjects and exclude noise trades.
The total number of trades was 1375, spread over all 6 treatments. We recorded 28 time-
outs, leaving 1347 recognized trades. Time-outs will henceforth be omitted from the
analysis.18 Across all sessions 390 traders were allocated the S1 signal, 550 the S2 signal
and 407 the S3 signal.
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4.1 The Decision to Pass
We admitted the option to pass for several reasons. First, as subjects had to take their
decision in a limited time frame, we had to include either the explicit decision to pass or
the decision to allow the clock to run out. Including passing as an option allowed us to
count a pass as a deliberate action and to distinguish them from accidental timeouts.
Second, the structure of our setup lends meaning to passes. Traders are owners of
a share and they have the choice to buy an extra share, or to sell the share that they
already own. Our rationale for providing them with an endowment was twofold. First,
it allowed us to avoid explaining ‘short-selling’. Second, as extant owners any decision
has direct payoff consequences. Namely, by electing to pass and thus to retain their share
subjects have de facto decided that the share is worth more to them than the current price.
By allocating a share endowment and giving subjects the ability to pass we thus made
sure that any action had payoff consequences.20 This contrasts with situations without
endowments where a passing decision has no tangible cost and not trading is a risk-free
action. In this sense, decisions in our experimental setup mimic the choices of investors,
who usually hold positions, as opposed to speculators, who hold no position and just go
long or short for a limited time.
In summary, when traders are owners, passing implies that they hold on to that share,
18One might wonder whether traders use passes and timeouts interchangeably. There were only 6 cases
where a trader used both passes and timeouts. 35 traders used multiple passes (and/or timeouts) and
only 18 traders recorded any timeouts. Since the number of timeouts was far greater in the example round
this suggests that motivated traders did not use timeouts as a substitute for passes, and that timeouts
were likely accidental. We therefore chose to remove timeouts from the analysis, though the tiny number
means that the results are neutral to their inclusion.
19The subjects were asked to comment on their own actions in a questionnaire (provided in the ap-
pendix) at the end of each session. When asked what motivated their decisions (across different sessions)
44% of subjects mentioned a combination of prices and signals, 31% only price, 18% only signal and the
remaining 7% had other motivations. 38% thought that in general the current price was more important
than the signal, 36% thought the signal was more important than the current price and the remaining
26% felt they were of similar value. 24% claimed to have carried out numerical calculations.
20Without the ability to pass subjects could still timeout. This might appear synonymous with passing,
but it lacks payoff consequences in the absence of share endowments. By enabling a “pass” decision we
focus the mind on payoff relevance as well as differentiating between active passes and passive timeouts
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presumably in hope of making a profit on that one share. In this sense, a hold is a positive
signal albeit weaker than a buy. Therefore, a pass can be counted as a “weak buy”.
As outlined in Section 2 passes contradict the theoretical model and thus Hypothesis 2.
We will use the passing decision in three ways: first, we count any pass as an irrational
action. Second, we count the decision to pass as a weak buy and thus classify a decision
to pass as rational when the theory predicts that the trader should buy. Third, we use
the decision to pass as a classification tool of more vs. less rational traders and check if
the behavior of these two groups differs.
Overall there were 145 passes (10.7% of all trades), 31 from S1 types (8%); 87 from
S2 types (16%) and 27 from S3 types (7%); 56% of the subjects (128 out of 230) never
pass. Hypothesis 1, the strongest interpretation of the theoretical model predicts that we
should see no passes at all, we do see some. One explanation for the presence of passes
could be risk aversion. We discuss this interpretation in section 8 and in the appendix:
in short, we found that including risk aversion did not explain the data better at all.
The total number of passes is small, especially for the S1 and S3 types. However, the
figure of 16% for S2 types indicates that there is cause for some doubt about Hypothesis 1
(no passes) from those traders with the middle signal.
Finding 1 (Passes) About 10% of trades were passes, contradicting Hypothesis 1. About
44% of the subjects pass at least once.
4.2 Fit of the data to the rational model
We start with a rough overview of decisions aggregated over all treatments that are in
line with rationality. Table 1 displays the data.
About 69.5% of trades are in accordance with the theoretical model when counting
passes as categorically incorrect. If we admit passes as “weak buys”, as outlined in the
last subsection, then all passes by S1 types remain irrational, whereas all passes by S3
types are admitted as rational. For the S2 types, passes are admitted as rational whenever
the rational action was to ‘buy’. With this specification, the overall model fit is 74.6%.
These numbers are similar to those in Cipriani and Guarino (2005) who obtain 73%
rationality.21 This similarity is noteworthy because our setting is more complex, particu-
larly for the S2 types. Moreover, Cipriani and Guarino’s experiment effectively considers
only types that are equivalent to our S1 and S3 types, and these types actually performed
better in our setup, with rationality in excess of 80%. We might thus reasonably argue
that the S1 and S3 types are acting in accordance with the rational theory.
21Anderson and Holt (1997) have 70% rationality, albeit with a fixed-price setting.
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The S2 types, on the other hand, often do not act rationally. As Table 1 illustrates,
almost half of their trades were against the rational model. This holds for both monotonic
and non-monotonic signals. In the herding Treatments 3 and 5, the S2 types perform quite
poorly, even when admitting passes as weak buys (22% and 37% fit). Had they taken
each action at random they would have done better.22
At the same time, the non-monotonic types face a more difficult decision problem
than the monotonic types. Theoretically, the decisions of monotonic S1 and S3 types
never change, so they can take the correct decision even without following the history.
The non-monotonic types on the other hand, have to follow the history carefully and small
mis-computations can cause them to be categorized as irrational. Yet the fit is also low
for increasing S2 types, even though their decision problem is similar to that of S3 types
(they should always buy).23
Finding 2 (Rationality) 69% of trades conformed to the rational choice. This is in line
with other experimental studies, thus overall we do not reject Hypothesis 2. In particular,
for S1 and S3 types this figure exceeds 80% so that for these types Hypothesis 2 should
not be rejected. Similarly, for the decreasing S2 and hill-shaped types, rationality is large
(combined: 68%). Hypothesis 2 should also not be rejected for increasing S2 when passes
count as weak buys. But Hypothesis 2 is not warranted for U-shaped types as well as
increasing S2 types when passes are wrong (combined fit 38%) as well as for U-shaped
types when passes are weak buys (fit 46%).
5 Herding and Contrarianism
All signal types can herd or act as contrarians in the sense of our definition. For instance,
an S1 type who buys after prices have risen would engage in buy herding. Yet only traders
with U-shaped signals can rationally herd as only their initial expectation can be below
and their time t expectation be above the price after prices have risen. Similarly, only
traders with hill-shaped signals can act rationally as contrarians. Yet U-shaped types
can also irrationally herd in the sense of our definition. Such a situation arises when a
trader with a negative U-shaped signal buys, prices have risen, but the type’s theoretical
expectation is still below the price. In other words, the requirements for rational herding
and contrarianism are rather restrictive.
In what follows we will first focus on the rational case. Namely, since we know each
subject’s theoretical expectations at any stage, we know when herding or contrarian be-
havior is theoretically mandated. As before we can exclude or include passes as ‘weak
22In section 5 we will highlight the persistency in their behavior.
23Future work may seek to analyze if herding is more prevalent with multiple monotonic types.
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buys’; we look at both cases separately. In a second step, we look at herding and contrari-
anism by all types and determine whether the hill and U-shaped signal traders stand out.
5.1 Rational Herding and Contrarianism
Rational herding can arise only in treatment 3 by S2 types who have a negative U-shaped
signal and in treatment 5 by S2 types who have a positive U-shaped signal. Rational
buy contrarianism can arise only in treatments 1 and 6 from recipients of the negative
hill-shaped signal.
When passes are considered irrational, only 18% of the herding trades that should
occur do occur. When passes are weak buys, rational herding occurs in 31% of the
mandated cases. Contrarian behavior arises in 62% of the cases when passes are wrong,
77% when passes are weak buys. The total number of possible rational contrarian trades
is, however, rather small compared to the herding trades. Table 2 summarizes the data.
Broken up by treatments, the performance of herding candidates in the positive U-
shaped Treatment 5 is rather poor: 90% of the required herds did not occur. However,
the number of observations is also rather small. The main reason for the small number of
observations is that (unintendedly) the sequences of trader arrivals were such that there
were rarely falling prices, which is the prerequisite for sell-herding.
The performance is somewhat better in the negative U-shaped Treatment 3: counting
passes as ‘weak buys’ the fraction of missing herds is ‘only’ 64%. However, this is a
notably larger fraction of herds than observed in Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005)
or Cipriani and Guarino (2005) (where herding behavior is irrational and rarely accounts
for more than 10-20% of trades, and usually much less). This lends some support to the
hypothesis that the U-shaped signal structure matters.
Rational contrarian behavior has a better performance than herding, although the
number of cases with theoretically mandated contrarianism is rather small, in particular
for treatment 1. One obvious explanation for the better fit is that the hill-shaped contrar-
ian signal is much easier to interpret since it indicates that the true value is the middle
one. Consequently, it is comparatively simple for subjects to pick an action that moves
prices in the direction of this middle value.
Finding 3 (Rational Herding and Contrarianism) Rational herding arises less fre-
quently than predicted by the theory. Contrarianism arises in about 2/3 of the cases
predicted by the theory, yet the rationality of the S2 contrarian types lags that of the S1
and S3 types with respect to rational contrarian actions.
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5.2 General Herding and Contrarianism: Regression Analysis
The analysis thus far revealed that herding and contrarianism often does not arise when
it is theoretically mandated. A second, important implication of the theory (by virtue of
its economic intuition) is that information matters in the sense that recipients of U and
hill-shaped signals should be more likely to act as herders and contrarians than any other
signal type. We thus directly test the link between herding (U-shaped) and contrarian
(hill-shaped) signals and incidences of herding and contrarian trades. In particular, we ask:
(1) If someone has a herding (U-shaped) signal, is this person more likely to herd than
someone who has any other type of signal?
(2) If someone has a contrarian (hill-shaped) signal, is this person more likely to act
as a contrarian than someone who has any other type of signal?
The random assignment of signals to traders and time slots allows us to interpret mean
differences in signal-specific effects as the average causal effects of the signal. Formally, we
estimate the following equations to test the hypothesis that a type of signal, specifically U-
shaped or hill-shaped, is a significant cause for herding or contrarian behavior respectively:
herdi,t = α+ βu-shapei,t + ǫi,t, contrai,t = α + βhill shapei,t + ǫi,t (1)
where the dependent variables herdi,t and contrai,t are dummies that apply our definition
in that they are 1 if individual i herds or acts as a contrarian respectively at trade t and 0
otherwise, α is a constant, and u-shapei,t and hill shapei,t are signal dummies that are 1
if the individual received a U-shaped or hill-shaped signal (for herding or contrarianism
respectively). Given the random assignment of signals and time slots, we can assume that
E[u-shapei,t · ǫi,t] = 0 and E[hill shapei,t · ǫi,t] = 0, the main identifying assumption.
We estimated the model by Logit and report the marginal effects at the mean.24
Standard errors are clustered by sessions to control for group-specific correlations.25
24We also ran several alternative unreported specifications: a linear regression, a linear regression
controlling for trader fixed effects, and a linear regression controlling for group-level fixed effects (a group
is the collection of subjects in one of our 13 sessions). The estimation was less precise for the fixed effects
regressions, largely because the group-level clustering of standard errors caused a significant reduction
in degrees of freedom. Yet the estimates were qualitatively similar irrespective of the estimation method
and we thus only report the Logit results. Marginal effects were computed with Stata’s built-in tools.
25In principle, actions are not independent because a trader at time t can only buy herd if sufficiently
many other traders before have bought shares so that prices have risen. However, in our estimation
we condition on the possibility of herding or contrarianism. Since a herding or contrarian action is
not observable (only buys, sales and no trades are observable), herding decisions should objectively be
conditionally independent. Thus our approach is possibly overly cautious and if anything our use of
clustered standard errors may slightly underplay the significance of our estimates.
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Herding and U-shaped signals. In this specification, β represents the impact of the
signal on a subject’s choice of whether or not to herd. It is the main coefficient of interest
and should be positive because, according to the theory, the U-shaped signal should
increase the probability of acting as a herder.
In line with our exposition thus far, we distinguish the case where passes are cate-
gorically irrational from the case where passes count as weak buys. The estimation is
restricted to the cases where herding is possible. This restriction is reasonable because,
for instance, when prices rise and a trader has signal S3, then such a trader cannot herd
because none of his actions would satisfy the definition of herding.
Table 4 summarizes the results from our regression. Overall, for the case where passes
are categorically wrong, obtaining a U-shaped signal increases the probability of herding
by about 5.8% relative to any other signal and it is significant at the 1.7% level. When
counting passes as weak buys, the marginal impact of the signal value increases to 8.1%.
Overall the estimation confirms the hypothesis that recipients of U-shaped, herding signals
are generally more likely to herd, providing support for Hypothesis 4.
Contrarianism and Hill-shaped Signals. Next, we estimate equation (1) to test the
hypothesis that a hill-shaped signal is a significant cause of contrarian behavior. Our
theory predicts that the coefficient β is positive so that a hill-shaped signal has a larger
impact on the occurrence of contrarianism relative to other kinds of signals. As with
herding, we restrict to the cases where it is possible that traders act as contrarians.
Table 4 summarizes the results from our regression. Obtaining a hill-shaped signal
increases the chance of acting as a contrarian by about 33.7% relative to any other kind of
signal. When admitting passes as weak buys, the marginal effect increases to about 50%.
These coefficients are significantly different from zero at all conventional levels. Overall we
confirm the insights from the preceding sections that the impact of the contrarian signal
is stronger and the theory is more reliable in yielding predictions. Again, Hypothesis 4
gains support.
Finding 4 (Impact of the Information Structure) The regression analysis indicates
that receiving a U-shaped signal significantly raises the probability of acting as a herder
compared to obtaining any other signal (by 5.8%). Similarly, receiving a hill-shaped signal
significantly raises the probability of acting as a contrarian compared to obtaining any
other signal (by 33.7%). Thus there is support for Hypothesis 4.
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6 Monotonic Types
While the general behavior of the S1 and S3 types is in line with the theoretical model
(about 80% of their traders are ‘rational’), we do observe that S3 types engage in selling
and that S1 types engage in buying; similarly for monotonic S2 types. We now want to
assess whether this behavior is systematic. Specifically, we test whether an increase in
the price changes the probability of a specific trade. Theoretically, the price should have
no impact on the decision because S1 traders should always sell, S3 traders should always
buy. We thus estimated the following regression
tradei,t = α + β∆pricei,t + ǫt, (2)
where is tradei,t a dummy that is 1 if there is a buy or pass, and 0 when there is a sale,
26 and
the independent variable ∆pricei,t is the percentage change of the price from 100, i.e. the
price at the time of the trade divided by 100 and subtracting 1. Since the time slot in which
people are allowed to trade is assigned at random, we can assume that E[∆pricei,t ·ǫi,t] = 0.
We estimated the model by Logit27 separately for the signals S1, S3, increasing S2,
decreasing S2, all increasing together, and all decreasing together. The main variable
of interest in (2) is β which measures whether a rising price affects the probability of a
trader buying or selling. Our theory (formalized in Hypothesis 2) predicts that the price
should have no impact on whether any of the types under consideration buys or sells.
Consequently, parameter β should be insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, if
it is not zero, then we gain insights about systematic herding or contrarian behavior.
For instance, consider type S3. If the sign of β is negative, then this type becomes less
likely to buy as prices increase. Such behavior tentatively indicates systematic contrarian
behavior. Likewise, if β were positive for the S1 types, then this implies that the S1 types
are more likely to buy when prices rise; this is a tentative herding effect.
Table 5 summarizes the results of our estimation. We find that for the S3 types a 1%
increase in the price from the original level lowers the probability of a buy by 0.5%. This
estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Thus as prices increase, the
S3 types become more likely to sell, which confirms their tendency to act as contrarians.
The coefficients for all other types individually are insignificantly different from zero.
Increasing types together have a significant negative coefficient, which is driven by the S3
types (the coefficient has almost the same magnitude as for the S3 alone). Decreasing
types together have a weakly negative coefficient of similar magnitude as the increasing
26We also estimated specifications in which the dummy takes value 2 for a buy and 1 for a pass, and
one where passes are ignored altogether. The findings coincide qualitatively for all specifications.
27Ordinary least squares regressions with and without trader fixed effects also yield the same insights.
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types. While it appears that we should get symmetric results for the S1 and the S3 types,
for this we must have sufficiently many incidences of falling prices, which we do not have.28
We thus conclude that there is enough evidence for contrarian behavior of the S3 types
and we have no evidence for herding.
Finding 5 (Price Changes and the Decisions of Types with Monotonic LFs)
Theory predicts that the price does not affect the decision of signal types with monotonic
LFs. Our regressions show that as prices increase, the S3 types become less likely to
buy. The sign and magnitude of the effect is similar for all other monotonic signal types.
Statistically significance obtains for signal S3, all increasing types taken together, and all
decreasing types taken together.
S2 types who receive a monotonically increasing signal arguably receive a weaker ver-
sion of the S3 signal; similarly for a decreasing S2, which is a weaker negative signal
than S1. It is thus curious that S3 types display a reaction towards the price whereas in-
creasing S2 types do not. That being said, the coefficient estimate has the same magnitude
but is insignificant due to the large standard error.
To complete the picture we thus repeated the regressions in (1), but omitted all in-
cidences of non-monotonic signals from the data. We observe that, when omitting non-
monotonic signals, receiving an increasing S2 signal significantly increases the probability
of both acting as a herder (by about 10.4%) and as a contrarian (by about 17%) over all
other (monotonic) signals. This bi-directional behavior thus explains the large standard
error in the estimation of equation (2).
7 More vs. Less Rational Types
According to the rational theory the decision to pass is never optimal. Therefore, someone
who passes can be considered to be less rational than somebody who does not. About
56% of the subjects (128 out of 230) never pass; the remaining subjects pass at least once.
We now want to analyze to what extent our estimates in Table 4 are affected by the
less rational, “passing” types. We thus ask the following question: what is the probability
that a subject herds/acts as a contrarian conditional on being a less rational type relative
to the more rational types? To answer this question, we ran the following regressions
herdi = α + β1U shapei + β2passeri + β3U shapei × passeri + ǫi, (3)
contrai = α + β1hill shapei + β2passeri + β3hill shapei × passeri + ǫi. (4)
28In some unreported regressions, in which we restrict attention only to those cases where prices fell,
there is some weak evidence (significant at the 10% level) that the coefficient sign is negative. This,
again, is evidence in favor of contrarianism.
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The dependent variables herdi and contrai are the herding and contrarian dummies from
the equations in (1), U shapei and hill shapei are the signal dummies, α is a constant,
passeri is a dummy that takes value 1 if the trading subject has passed at least once and 0
otherwise, and U shapei×passeri and hill shapei×passeri are products of the two dummies.
For each case we estimated the model by Logit, restricted to incidences where herding
and contrarianism respectively can occur; we report the marginal effects at the mean.
As before, standard errors were clustered at the group level to correct for possible inter-
group correlations. The coefficient β1 allows us to estimate the marginal effect among
more rational traders, coefficient β3 allows us to estimate the differential marginal effect
among less rational traders, so that β1 + β3 allows us to determine the effect of a signal
among less rational traders.
Naturally, the regression is run only for the case where passes are not weak buys.
We find that for those who pass at least once, neither receiving the U-shaped nor the
hill-shaped signal affects their probability of engaging in herding and contrarian behavior
respectively. For the types who never pass (”the more rational types”), on the other
hand, the marginal effects of the signals are (much) stronger and significant. Table 6
summarizes the results of our estimation.29
Note however, that, omitting the cases where a pass occurs, subjects who pass do not
make more irrational decisions than their counterparts (78% of both types’ decisions are
correct when ignoring the passing decisions themselves). The results here are thus not
driven by the general (ir-)rationality of the passing types’ actions.
Finding 6 (More vs. Fewer Rational Types) Although the behavior of passers and
non-passers is overall similar (ignoring the passes themselves), when looking at the deci-
sions that may involve contrarianism or herding, the behavior of passers vs. non-passers
is different: U-shaped and hill-shaped signals do not affect the passers’ probabilities of
engaging in herding an contrarianism whereas for non-passers the effect of these signals is
significant and 75% stronger than in the general population of subjects (10.2% vs. 5.8%).
8 Alternative Theories of Behavior
We argued in Sections 4 and 5 that our findings are generally supportive of the theory.
Yet there are still challenges, for instance, regarding the apparent contrarianism by S3
29Non-passers are also more likely to act in accordance with the theory when it comes to herding: they
herd when they should in 24.2% compared to the passers who herd only in 12.8% of the relevant cases.
All of these findings indicate that future research into behavioral heterogeneity between traders, along
the lines of Ivanov, Levin, and Peck (2009), is warranted.
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types for high prices or the lack of herding and (to a lesser extent) contrarianism by S2
types relative to theoretical predictions.
It is well-established in experimental work that models with Bayesian rationality and
risk-neutral agents may not provide the best fit for the data.30 In the appendix we consider
a range of alternative, behavioral theories to see if we can find a better fit with our data.
In turn we consider: omitting decisions that are within an ǫ error-region, risk aversion,
loss aversion, non-Bayesian updating and models of error correction (in the spirit of level-
K reasoning (see Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001)) and Quantal Response
Equilibria (see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)). These
alternative hypotheses usually depend on some parameter(s). Our general approach is to
vary this parameter and see how the variation improves the overall fit of the alternative
model to the data. Such an approach is, of course, a maximum likelihood technique,
albeit a coarse one.
Finding 7 (Alternative Theories of Behaviour) Although some of the alternative the-
ories that we consider in the appendix provide reasonable approximations of behavior, none
perform significantly better than the rational theory, and some perform worse.
9 Conclusion
Our analysis can be loosely separated into two parts. In the first part, we directly test
the theoretical findings on herding and contrarianism put forward by Avery and Zem-
sky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011). In the second part, we determine whether
people behave in the spirit of Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011)
with respect to the effect of their information on their tendency to engage in herding or
contrarian behavior.
Since we know all actions and signals, we can compute the theoretically optimal deci-
sion for each subject at any time, and we find that about 70% of all decisions are explained
by the rational model. This figure is in line with the literature, even though subjects face
a more difficult decision than in previous studies. However, herding often does not arise
when it is theoretically predicted. Contrarianism is more prolific than herding, but arises
both rationally and irrationally.
In the second part of our analysis we focus on understanding the link between in-
formation and observed herding and contrarian behavior. Prior experimental work on
30I., Levin, and Peck (2012) provide a nice examination of deviations from Nash equilibrium and discuss
the role of noise and cognitive biases. Their setting with endogenous timing of actions and fixed prices
complements ours which has exogenous timing of actions and moving prices.
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sequential trading outlined in Section 1 has shown that subjects have a “natural” ten-
dency to act as contrarians.31 Notwithstanding this finding, In principle, all signal types
can irrationally herd or be contrarian. Therefore it is important to understand whether
herding and contrarianism are observed equally across types, or whether they are more
prevalent among certain types. Our results are in line with the theory in that herding
is more commonly observed among types who have the theoretical potential to herd;
similarly for contrarianism.
Our findings have implications for the economic relevance and significance of social
learning in financial markets. Ultimately, the economic importance of herding and con-
trarianism depends on the number of people who receive U-shaped and hill-shaped sig-
nals.32 We can envisage situations where this is both likely and predictable. For instance,
consider a situation where the great majority of traders believe that prices will change,
either rising or falling: perhaps a regulatory decision is about to be made that will either
greatly benefit or greatly harm a firm, or an electoral decision is imminent and this will
advantage or disdvantage the firm. In either case the fraction of traders with U-shaped
signals might be arbitrarily close to 1. If such a situation arises in markets, then even the
low probability of rational herding may lead to economically meaningful price swings.
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Table 1
Total Fit of the Rational Model by Treatments.
In each box, the first entry signifies the number of choices that are not according to the rational model,
the second number indicates the total number of choice by a type for that treatment, and the third
number is the proportion of rational decisions.
all passes are wrong some passes are ok
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1, negative hill shape wrong 7 36 23 7 36 14
total 53 98 71 53 98 71
% correct 87% 63% 68% 87% 63% 80%
Treatment 2, increasing 10 40 17 10 28 10
70 84 67 70 84 67
86% 52% 75% 86% 67% 85%
Treatment 3, negative U shape 10 73 19 10 59 12
58 94 74 58 94 74
83% 22% 74% 83% 37% 84%
Treatment 4, decreasing 12 26 9 12 26 6
56 99 74 56 99 74
77% 74% 88% 77% 74% 92%
Treatment 5, positive U shape 9 56 8 9 44 7
67 95 63 67 95 63
87% 41% 87% 87% 54% 89%
Treatment 6, negative hill shape 20 31 6 20 27 6
86 82 58 86 82 58
77% 63% 90% 77% 67% 90%
Total wrong 68 262 82 68 220 55
Total Trades 322 290 325 322 332 352
Total correct % 82% 53% 80% 82% 61% 86%
Overall 69.5% 74.6%
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Table 2
Occurrence of Rational Herding/Contrarianism.
The first entry in each box denote the number of herding or contrarian actions that occur, the second
entry denotes the number of herding/contrarian actions that were theoretically mandated, and the third
entry is the fraction of rational herding or contrarian actions that is observed.
Herding Contrarianism
passes are passes are passes are passes are
irrational rational irrational rational
Treatment 1, negative hill shape does occur 4 4
should occur 6 6
% as expected 67% 67%
Treatment 3, negative U shape 18 32
89 89
20% 36%
Treatment 5, positive U shape 2 2
18 18
11% 11%
Treatment 6, negative hill shape 12 16
20 20
67% 80%
herding/contrarianism occurring 20 34 16 20
theoretically mandated 109 109 26 26
percent that arises rationally 18% 31% 62% 77%
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Table 3
Herding and Contrarian Trades split up by Treatment.
For each treatment, entries in the top row indicate herding/contrarianism that did occur, entries in the middle row refer to the number of times that
herding/contrarianism could have occurred. The third row entries indicate the percentage of realized herding/contrarian trades.
Herding Trades Contrarian trades
pass=pass pass=weak buy pass=pass pass=weak buy
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill shape occurs 4 11 1 7 34 1 0 4 13 0 4 13
possible 52 91 6 52 91 6 1 7 65 1 7 65
% occurs 8% 12% 17% 13% 37% 17% 0% 57% 20% 0% 57% 20%
Treatment 2 increasing 5 5 1 8 5 1 1 23 9 2 23 9
59 20 7 59 20 7 9 64 47 9 64 47
8% 25% 14% 14% 25% 14% 11% 36% 19% 22% 36% 19%
Treatment 3 negative U shape 3 20 0 10 21 0 0 0 6 0 0 6
58 94 1 58 94 1 0 0 73 0 0 73
5% 21% 0% 17% 22% 0% 8% 8%
Treatment 4 decreasing 4 10 0 6 13 0 2 6 6 6 10 6
33 63 24 33 63 24 19 25 50 19 25 50
12% 16% 0% 18% 21% 0% 11% 24% 12% 32% 40% 12%
Treatment 5 positive U shape 5 2 2 7 2 2 1 27 5 2 28 5
48 36 25 47 36 25 19 59 38 19 59 38
10% 6% 8% 15% 6% 8% 5% 46% 13% 11% 47% 13%
Treatment 6 negative hill shape 7 7 1 10 19 1 5 16 5 10 17 5
48 58 19 48 58 19 38 24 39 38 24 39
15% 12% 5% 21% 32% 5% 13% 67% 13% 26% 71% 13%
actual herding/contrarian trades 28 55 5 48 94 5 9 76 44 20 82 44
possible herding/contrarian trades 300 363 82 300 363 82 86 179 312 86 179 312
in percent 10% 15% 6% 16% 26% 6% 10% 42% 14% 6% 23% 46%
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Table 4
U-Shaped and Hill-Shaped Signals vs. Herding and Contrarianism.
The table combines the situations where passes never count as herding or contrarian trades and where
they do count as weak buys. Panel A in the table represents regressions of the occurrence of a herding
trade on the trader receiving a U-shaped signal, as in the left equation in (1). Panel B in the table
represents regressions of the occurrence of a contrarian trade on the trader receiving a hill-shaped signal,
as in the right equation in (1). We present the marginal effects obtained by logit regressions. Standard
errors were clustered by sessions. The data is restricted to include only trades that could be herding and
contrarian trades respectively. For all tables that follow, standard errors are in parentheses, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Constants were included in the regression but are not
reported for brevity.
Dependent Variable: Herding/Contrarianism Indicator
Passes do not count Passes count as weak buys
U-shaped signal hill-shaped signal U-shaped signal hill-shaped signal
Panel A:
herding 0.058**
(0.024)
0.081**
(0.035)
Panel B:
contrarianism 0.337***
(0.051)
0.499***
(0.097)
Observations 741 577 741 577
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Table 5
The Decision to Buy for Monotonic Signal Types.
The table displays the results from a logit regression of equation (2), i.e. the decision to buy on the price
change; standard errors were robustly clustered by sessions. Symbol ր stands for ‘increasing’, ց for
‘decreasing’. For all types, the probability of buying declines as the price increases. The hypothesis is
that the coefficient is insignificant (monotonic types always either buy or sell, irrespective of the price).
Coefficients are significant for the S3 types, contrary to theoretical predictions, but they are insignificant
for all other types. The numbers can be interpreted as follows. For instance, for S3 types, a 10% increase
in the price will lead to a 5% reduction in the probability that this type buys. Standard errors and
significance levels are denoted as in Table 4. Constants were included in the regression but are not
reported for brevity.
Dependent Variable: Buy Indicator
Independent Variable: price change in %
Increasing LFs Decreasing LFs
S3 S2 ր all ր S1 S2 ց all ց
Panel A: Passes are buys
∆p -0.549***
(0.149)
-0.457
(0.589)
-0.420**
(0.137)
-0.276
(0.216)
-0.866
(0.386)
-0.419**
(0.221)
Observations 407 84 491 390 97 487
Panel B: Passes are omitted
∆p -0.692***
(0.168)
-0.935
(0.558)
-0.585***
(0.165)
-0.122
(0.234)
-0.378
(0.376)
-0.201
(0.234)
Observations 380 72 452 359 90 449
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Table 6
Do People who Miss the Rationality Test Act Differently?
The table displays the results from a logit regression of equation (3) which assesses whether the occurrence of a herding/contrarian trade is more likely
to occur when a U-shaped signal recipient passed the first rationality test. According to this test, a subject is less rational if s/he chose the pass decision
(which is categorically irrational) in any treatment. For this regression the decision to pass is, of course, not considered to be a weak buy. The table
reports the marginal effects. The data is restricted to include only trades that could be herding or contrarian trades respectively. Standard errors were
clustered by sessions. Significance levels are denoted as in Table 4 and we omit constants from the report.
U shape
U shape
× passer
hill shape
hill shape
× passer
passer Observations
Panel A: Herding
Herding Indicator 0.102*** -0.114*** 0.025 741
(0.029) (0.042) (0.036)
Panel B: Contrarianism
Contrarianism Indicator 0.475*** -0.306 -0.084** 577
(0.096) (0.161) (0.033)
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APPENDIX
Appendix A contains the proof of the main theorem in the paper which is adapted from
Park and Sabourian (2011). Appendix B is a thorough discussion of the alternative
theories mentioned in the main text in section 8. Appendix C provides an experimental
timeline. Appendices D, E and F (respectively) provide the full set of subject instructions,
the questionnaire and some details about the software. Tables from Appendix B are
provided at the end. We also attach the information pages that were given subjects
before each treatment, Figures 1 to 5. These pages include the parameter values that
were used in the experiment.
A Proof of the Theorem
The theorem follows directly from the results in Park and Sabourian (2011); we repeat the
arguments here for the reader’s convenience. We first show the following three properties.
Lemma 1 (i) For any S, t and history H t, E[V |S,H t]−E[V |H t] has the same sign as
qt1q
t
2 [Pr(S|V2)−Pr(S|V1)]+q
t
2q
t
3 [Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V2)]+ 2q
t
1q
t
3 [Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V1)]. (5)
(ii) For any signal S, E[V |S] is less than E[V ] if and only if S has a negative bias, and
E[V |S] is greater than E[V ] if and only if S has a positive bias.
(iii) If E[V |H t] > E[V ] then qt3 > q
t
1 and if E[V ] > E[V |H
t] then qt1 > q
t
3.
Proof: (i) Observe first that
E[V |S,H t]− E[V |H t] = Vqt2
(
Pr(S|V2)
Pr(S)
− 1
)
+ 2Vqt3
(
Pr(S|V3)
Pr(S)
− 1
)
.
The RHS of the the above equality has the same sign as
qt2
(
Pr(S|V2)
∑
j
qtj −
∑
j
Pr(S|Vj)q
t
j
)
+ 2 qt3
(
Pr(S|V3)
∑
j
qtj −
∑
j
Pr(S|Vj)q
t
j
)
= qt1q
t
2 (Pr(S|V2)− Pr(S|V1)) + q
t
2q
t
3 (Pr(S|V2)− Pr(S|V3))
+2 qt3
(
qt1(Pr(S|V3)− Pr(S|V1) + q
t
2 (Pr(S|V3)− Pr(S|V2))
)
.
(ii) By the symmetry assumption on the priors (q11 = q
1
3), the (5) is negative (positive) at
t = 1 if and only if (Pr(S|V3)− Pr(S|V1))(q
1
2 + 2q
1
1)q
1
3 is less (greater) than 0; the latter is
equivalent to S having a negative (positive) bias.
(iii) The claim follows from E[V |H t]− E[V ] = V[(1− qt1− q
t
3) + 2q
t
3]−V = V(q
t
3 − q
t
1).
Proofs of the Theorem (a) and (b): These follow immediately from part (i) of the
lemma because for an increasing LF, all terms in (5) are always positive, for a decreasing
LF they are always negative.
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Proof of the Theorem (c) and (d): “ ⇐:” We will prove the “only if” parts only
for the case of buy herding and buy contrarian; the proof for the sell cases are analogous.
Thus suppose that S buy herds or acts as a buy contrarian at some H t. The proof
proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: S has a negative bias: Buy herding and buy contrarian imply E[V |S] < bid1.
Since bid1 < E[V ] we must have E[V |S] < E[V ]. Then by part (ii) of the above lemma, S
has a negative bias.
Step 2: (Pr(S|V1) − Pr(S|V2))(q
t
3 − q
t
1) > 0: It follows from the definition of buy
herding and buy contrarian that E[V |S,H t] > askt. Since E[V |H t] < askt we must have
E[V |S,H t] > E[V |H t]. By part (i) of the above lemma, this implies that (5) is positive
at H t. Also, by the negative bias (Step 1), the third term in (5) is negative. Therefore,
the sum of the first two terms in (5) is positive: qt3(Pr(S|V3)− Pr(S|V2)) + q
t
1(Pr(S|V2)−
Pr(S|V1)) > 0. But this means, by negative bias, that (Pr(S|V1)−Pr(S|V2))(q
t
3− q
t
1) > 0.
Step 3a: If S buy herds at H t then S is nU-shaped : It follows from the definition
of buy herding that E[V |H t] > E[V ]. By part (iii) of the above lemma, this implies that
qt3 > q
t
1. Then it follows from Step 2 that Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2). Also, since S buy-herds,
by parts (a), S cannot have a decreasing csd and we must have Pr(S|V2) < Pr(S|V3).
Thus, S is nU-shaped.
Step 3b: If S acts as a buy contrarian at H t then S is nHill shaped. It follows from
the definition of buy contrarian that E[V |H t] < E[V ]. By part (iii) of the above Lemma,
this implies that qt3 < q
t
1. But then it follows from Step 2 that Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2). Since
by Step 1 S has a negative bias, we have Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V3). Thus S is
nHill-shaped.
“⇒”: To see the “if” part notice first that since by assumption S has a negative bias,
it follows from part (ii) of the lemma that S sells at the initial history. Also, since S is
U-shaped we have Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2). Therefore, by part (i) of the lemma, there exists
some η > 0 such that the second term in (5) always exceeds η.
Herding requires that the negative terms in (5) are sufficiently small. Suppose that
there exists a history H t such that qt1/q
t
3 < 1 and
qt
1
qt
3
+
2qt
1
qt
2
< η. Then by the former
inequality and (iii) of the Lemma we have E[V |H t] > E[V ]. Also, since the sum of the
first and the third term in (5) is greater than −q2q3(
qt
1
qt
3
+
2qt
1
qt
2
), it follows from
qt
1
qt
3
+
2qt
1
qt
2
< η
that the sum must also be greater than −η. This, together with the second term in (5)
exceeding η, implies that (5) is greater than zero, and hence S must be buying at H t.
The proof for buy contrarianism is analogous: by the same reasoning as above S sells
at H1. Also, since S has a hill shape we have Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V1). Therefore, by part (i)
of the Lemma, there exists some η > 0 such that the first term in (5) always exceeds η.
Suppose that there exists a history H t such that qt3/q
t
1 < 1 and
qt
3
qt
1
+
2qt
3
qt
1
< η. Then
by the former inequality and (iii) of the Lemma we have E[V |H t] < E[V ]. Also, since
the sum of the second and the third term in (5) is greater than −q1q2(
qt
3
qt
1
+
2qt
3
qt
2
), it follows
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from
qt
3
qt
1
+
2qt
3
qt
1
< η that the sum must also be greater than −η. Since the first term in (5)
exceeds η, this implies that (5) is greater than zero, and hence S must be buying at H t.
What remains to be shown is that the above mentioned history exists. Consider any
arbitrary history H t and any two values Vl < Vh. By (a) type S1 always sells, by (b) type
S3 always buys. There are thus two cases for a buy at H
t: either only S3 types buy or S2
and S3 types buy. In the former case, β
t
i = γ + µPr(S3|Vi). As S3 is strictly increasing,
there exits ǫ > 0 such that βth − β
t
l > ǫ. In the latter case,
βth − β
t
l = µ (Pr(S3|Vh) + Pr(S2|Vh)− Pr(S3|Vl)− Pr(S2|Vl))
= µ (1− Pr(S1|Vh)− (1− Pr(S1|Vl))) = µ (Pr(S1|Vl)− Pr(S1|Vh)) .
Since S1 is strictly decreasing, there exists an ǫ > 0 such that β
t
h − β
t
l > ǫ.
By a similar reasoning it can be shown that there must exist ǫ > 0 so that σtl −σ
t
h > ǫ.
Consequently, the probability of a buy is uniformly increasing in the liquidation value
at any date and history, i.e. for some ǫ > 0, βtj > β
t
i + ǫ for any j > i and any t. Similarly,
the probability of a sale is uniformly decreasing in the liquidation value at any H t, i.e.
for some ǫ > 0, σti > σ
t
j + ǫ for any j > i and any t.
Since qt+1i /q
t+1
j = (q
t
iβ
t
i)/(q
t
jβ
t
j) when there is a buy at date t, it follows that a buy
reduces both qt1/q
t
2 and q
t
1/q
t
3 uniformly. Thus a sufficiently large number of buys induces
the described histories that allow buy herding.
Similarly, with a sale qt+1i /q
t+1
j = (q
t
iσ
t
i)/(q
t
jσ
t
j). Thus, a sale reduces both q
t
3/q
t
1 and
qt3/q
t
2 uniformly. Thus, a sufficiently large number of sales induces the described histories
needed for buy contrarianism. This argument completes the proof. 
B Alternative Explanations for Trading Behavior
B.1 Development of Alternative Hypotheses
While we believe that our data indicates that people act in the spirit of the rational
model with risk neutrality, we examine numerous behavioral explanations for any observed
irrationality. In particular we study specifications in which people dampen the effect of
observed trades in computing their expectations, namely, by re-scaling probabilities, or
by correcting for their predecessors’ presumed mistakes. However, while some of these
models can generate a higher fit with the data, very high levels of dampening need to
be assumed to achieve a measurable effect and these same dampening effects remove the
scope to explain rational herding behavior. We also consider the potential for risk and
loss aversion to explain the data but find no effect.
Specifically, the theoretical model implicitly imposes strong requirements on subjects
being able to compute history-dependent expectations correctly. We will now discuss
ways to capture possible departures of the theory. If subjects do not act in accordance
with the theory, we have to check if giving them leeway when the decision is close allows
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for a better fit of the data to the model. We will thus examine
Hypothesis 6 (Small Errors) Subjects generally act according the theory as in Hy-
pothesis 2 if the decision is not too close, that is, if prices and private expectations are
sufficiently different.
Standard economic theory suggests that people are risk averse. If they are, then this
may affect the performance of our model and we thus have to examine
Hypothesis 7 (Risk Aversion) Subjects generally act according the theory as in Hy-
pothesis 2 subject to a risk averse utility function.
Similarly, a large body of experimental research has found that people tend to react
differently to relative gains and losses. We will thus check whether this kind of behavior
would affect the performance of our model.
Hypothesis 8 (Loss Aversion) Subjects generally act according the theory as in Hy-
pothesis 2 subject to a loss averse valuation function.
Next, for subjects to act in accordance with the theory, it is imperative that they
perform Bayesian updating correctly. Yet there are various behavioral theories which
contradict Bayesian updating. We aim to examine whether, when and how these might
explain departures from the standard fully rational theory.
Hypothesis 9 (Non-Bayesian Updating) Subjects generally act according the theory
as in Hypothesis 2 subject to updating their beliefs in a non-Bayesian fashion.
Finally, the underlying decision problem is not simple, and this is common knowledge
among subjects. They may thus believe that at least some of their counterparts may
persistently err. Moreover, they may also think that some of their counterparts think the
same way and react to this irrationality.33 We will thus examine whether error correction
formulations will help us understand the data better.
Hypothesis 10 (Error Correction) Subjects generally act according the theory as in
Hypothesis 2 subject to correcting for possible errors and rational reactions to errors that
their fellow experiment participants may make.
Each of the alternative Hypotheses 6 to 10 will be analyzed in the following series of
subsections.
33Notions of level K reasoning (see Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001)) and Quantal Response
Equilibria (see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)) describe this type of
behavior.
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B.1.1 Robustness to Small Errors
Hypothesis 6 considers the scope for subjects to make errors when the decision they have
to make is a close one. To test this idea, we omit all trades that occur when prices and
expectations are within ǫ of each other, for small values of ǫ. This variation typically
worsens the fit of the model. The reason is that while it does capture some errors made
when the decision is close, it also rules out some correct decisions that were made when
the decision is close. For instance if we set ǫ = .01, then the total model fit is reduced to
67% (for S1, S2 and S3, 78%, 45%, and 80% respectively). We repeated the analysis with
different values for ǫ but could not generate a higher fit for the data.
Finding 8 (Errors when the decision is close) Subjects do not seem to be more likely
to act in accordance with prescribed optimal actions when the decision is not too close and
hence we do not support Hypothesis 6.
B.1.2 Risk Aversion
One persistent finding from the last sections is that traders exhibit a general tendency to
act as contrarians. One might thus also entertain the idea that traders act as contrarians
because of risk-aversion (Hypothesis 7).34 We can go about examining this by computing
the optimal action when people have a concave utility function. We checked this employing
both CARA and CRRA utility functions:
utility
CARA
(payoff|action) = −eρ·payoff, utility
CRRA
(payoff|action) =
payoff1−γ
1− γ
.
Theoretically, the CARA utility function is the superior choice in the framework because
we can ignore income effects.
For each type we determined the optimal action given the respective utility function
and compared it to the action taken by the subjects. Within a setup with risk-aversion,
a pass is indeed an action that has payoff consequences and may be optimal for some
posterior probabilities. Usually, as prices (and thus the probability of a high outcome)
rise, the optimal action traverses from a buy to a pass to a sell. Risk-aversion biases
decisions against buys and holds, because sells yield an immediate cash flow, whereas
holding the stock exposes the subject to the risky payoff tomorrow. The larger the risk-
aversion coefficient, the stronger the bias against buying.
Computing the expected utilities we find, however, that the performance of a model
with risk aversion is worse for all reasonable levels of risk aversion. For CRRA with log-
utility (γ = 1), it is below 50%; for CARA it is 48% for ρ = 1 and 64.5% for ρ = .01,
rising as ρ declines. As ρ declines, we capture more of the behavior by S3 types but less of
34With typically high and rising prices, acting in a contrarianism entails selling. Selling gives an
immediate payoff equal to price, whereas holding or buying entails a wait for a risky return. Contrarian
behavior may therefore be justifiable in terms of risk-aversion.
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the behavior by S2 types. Note that as ρ falls, we move closer to risk neutrality. Table 7
displays the results for some select parameter values that are indicative of the general
tendencies in the data.
Finding 9 (Risk Aversion) The performance of a model with risk aversion is worse
for all reasonable levels of risk aversion and so we do not support Hypotheses 7.
B.1.3 Loss-Aversion — S-Shaped Valuation Functions.
A host of experimental work in prospect theory following Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
has indicated that people pick choices based on change in their wealth rather than on
levels of utilities. These costs and benefits of changes in wealth are usually assessed with
valuation functions that are S-shaped. Kahnemann and Tversky suggested the following
functional form:
V (∆wealth|action) =
{
(∆wealth)α for ∆wealth ≥ 0
−γ(−∆wealth)β for ∆wealth < 0
where ∆wealth is the change in wealth and α, β, γ are parameters. We tried various alter-
native parameter configurations, searching for the best fit possible, but none performed
significantly better than α = β = 0.8 and γ = 2.25, which is a common specification
for the parameters stemming from experimental observations (Tversky and Kahneman
(1992)).
As with risk aversion, the performance of this model applied to our setup is much worse
than the performance of the benchmark rational model. For parameters as estimated by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the fit is below 38%. Table 8 illustrates this observation
for the above parameters as well as for one other configuration.35
Finding 10 (Loss Aversion) Using a variety of parameterizations we could not achieve
a better fit than under the benchmark rational model. Thus we do not support Hypoth-
esis 8 and conclude that loss aversion is not an important influence for behavior in our
experiment.
B.1.4 Non-Bayesian Forms of Updating
We consider various forms of non-Bayesian updating to assess whether they offer insights
over and above the benchmark rational model. One extreme decision rule formulation is
that of na¨ıve traders who ignore the history and who simply stick to their prior action.
As such, S1 types always sell, S3 types always buy and S2 types pick the actions that is
35Arguably, we are only using one part of the tools developed in prospect theory, S-shaped valuations,
and ignore that other component, decision weights. However, the latter have a relation to re-scaled
probabilities which we analyze separately.
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prescribed at the initial history (e.g. with a negative U-shaped signal, S2 traders always
sell). Initially, this specification appears to do well: it fits 73.6% of the data which is
higher than the rational model (with passes as wrong trades); and broken up by type,
the fit is 82% for S1, 63% for S2 and 80% for the S3, which is again higher than the
rational fit without passes but lower than the rational model with passes. Of course
with this alternative model, we cannot accommodate passes as ‘weak buys’ because this
would be contrary to the spirit of ‘no changes of the action’. Indeed this illustrates the
first weakness: a model based on people choosing their prior action will not help us to
understand any changes in behavior that might have occurred, in particular not for S1
and S3 types. Since the econometric analysis has already revealed that the S3 types are
sensitive to the price, this decision rule is rather weak. Looking only at those actions that
are at odds with rationality (and counting passes as wrong as would befit the hypothesis
here), only 30% (79 decisions) of the irrational actions of the S2 types are in line with this
hypothesis. This further reveals that the remaining 183 decisions are due to a change of
actions, which constitute a total of 33% of the S2 types’ actions.
While the fit of a model which emphasizes the ex-ante optimal action at the expense
of prices and history seems high, the model does not help explain any of the observed
changes of actions. We therefore argue that given the extra complexity of the model,
and the apparent only slight improvement in fit over and above the rational model, a
model focusing on prior actions is of limited use. We also investigated the possibility that
subjects do not update their beliefs at all as prices change but act solely on the basis
of their prior expectation. Finally, we considered probability shifting, whereby traders
underplay (overplay) low (high) probabilities coming from the observed history, which
is equivalent to traders overstating the probabilities of their prior expectations. The
usual symmetric treatment of this under- or overstating of probabilities is to transform
probability p into f(p)36 as follows:
f(p) =
pα
pα + (1− p)α
.
Parameter values α > 1 are associated with S-shaped re-valuations (extreme probabili-
ties (those close to 0 and 1) get overstated, moderate probabilities (those close to 1/2)
understated), α < 1 with reverse S-shaped valuations (extreme probabilities get under-
stated, moderate probabilities overstated). Note that the transformation f(p) applied to
probabilities of all three states do not yield a probability distribution. However, when
employed properly in the conditional posterior expectation the transformation achieves
36There are various other forms for these switches, e.g. non-symmetric switches where the effects are
stronger (or weaker) for larger probabilities. The interpretation and implementation of such asymmet-
ric shifts does, however, become difficult if not impossible with three states. Of the various possible
specifications we only pick a few as the spirit of all re-scalings is similar: updating is slowed.
In f , one re-scales pα by itself and the counter-probability; alternatively, if pi signifies the probability
of one state, one could imagine a re-scaling by pj
α for all states, j = 1, . . . , 3.
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the effect of a probability distribution.
Consequently, when modeling an overconfident trader who puts more weight on his
prior signal we would apply an α > 1 re-scaling on the initial probabilities. Alternatively,
one can also model slow updating directly by applying an α < 1 re-scaling to the posterior
probabilities. Of course the effect will be similar: in both cases the histories or updated
probabilities would not matter as much as under the rational model. We tried both
specifications and the results are similar. Here we report the results where Pr(V |H1) ×
Pr(S|V ) has been re-scaled with an α > 1; downward scaled probabilities of the history
Pr(V |Ht) yield similar insights.
Comparing the results here to those in Table 4, one can see that the fit of probability
scaling hardly improves for the S1 and S3 types. Moreover, while the total fit does improve
relative to the rational model, it does not improve dramatically. Most of the improvement
stems from contrarian trades that are now given a rationale. However, re-scaling does a
poor job at explaining herd-behavior of any sort.
Finding 11 (Non-Bayesian Updating) Having considered several forms of Hypothe-
sis 9 including emphasizing the ex-ante optimal action at the expense of prices and history,
acting solely on the basis of price and not history, and the underplaying of posteriors de-
rived from observed history or the overplaying of the signal-prior or we have discovered
no insights over and above the benchmark rational model.
B.1.5 Error Correction Provisions
To investigate Hypothesis 10, and inspired by level K reasoning (see Costa-Gomes, Craw-
ford, and Broseta (2001)) and Quantal Response Equilibria (see McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)), we will contemplate an alternative specifica-
tion for hampered updating in which agents do not trust their peers and instead believe
that their actions are random. In the rational model, consider a buy without herding in
state Vi: this event occurs with probability βi = .25/2 + .75 · Pr(S3|Vi) (recalling that
.25/2 is the probability of a noise buy). Now imagine that instead subjects believe that
only fraction δ of the informed buyers act rationally and that the remaining 1− δ take a
decision at random. Then the probability of a buy in state Vi becomes:
βi = .25 + .75((1− δ)/2 + δ · Pr(S3|Vi)).
The task is to find the δ for which this specification yields the best data fit; we obtained
the best fit for δ = 1/3. However, compared to the rational model the improvement of the
fit is minor (see Table 10): the rational fit is 69.5% vs. 71.6% with the error correction.
An alternative interpretation for this error correction is that the level of noise trading
is perceived higher than it actually is because other subjects act randomly: a δ of 33.33%
translates into a factual noise level of 75%. As the informational impact of each transaction
on the subject’s beliefs is dampened, after any history the private signal has a larger
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impact than under the rational model. This specification is thus in spirit similar to
probability shifting, but focuses on the idea that subjects believe that others either ignore
their signals or are simply unable to interpret it correctly.
A variation on this error correction theme is a specification in which a subject believes
that fraction 1 − δ act randomly but the subject assumes that the remaining fraction δ
takes this irrationality into account and reacts rationally to it. The difference to the first
specification is that in the first, the subject not only assumes irrationality on the part of
informed traders but also considers himself to be the only informed trader to take this
into consideration. Now we instead allow a later subject to believe that his predecessors
are also aware of the possible irrationality on the part of informed traders and employ this
knowledge in their decision-making. Consequently, in the first specification, S3 traders
would never have been presumed to rationally sell, whereas in the second specification
such behavior is admitted as rational.37 As with the simple error correction, we do not
obtain a substantially better fit with the data, as can be seen in Table 10: we obtained
the best fit for δ = .24 but the improvement is merely from a 71.6% to a 71.7% fit and is
thus negligible.
Finding 12 (Error Correction) A model in which agents recursively take their pre-
decessor’s decisions as prone to error offers no noteworthy improvement in fit over the
benchmark rational model and so we do not support Hypothesis 10.
B.1.6 Summary of Alternative Behavioral Explanations
While forms of slow updating improve the fit of the data slightly, no alternative model
is capable of providing a convincing explanation for the results. Slow updating and error
correction specifications (which imply overestimation of noise trading) are essentially very
similar, and also have strong similarities to a strategy of following the prior (which is
effectively a policy of zero updating). We also tested several other, related models but
37Rather than directly implementing level K reasoning or Quantal Response Equilibria, we choose our
alternative specification because it is an unusually complex task for the subjects to calculate these more
general measures of naive reasoning with 4 different known types of traders (noise traders and three
types of informed trader). Moreover, there is a subtle difference of our approach to the way that Quantal
Response Models can be implemented in models with and without prices. In an informational cascade
without prices a deviation from the cascading action is, in principle, a deviation from rationality. With
moving prices, such a simple observation can no longer be made, neither is it possible for subjects to
determine if there is a genuine error. Our notion of overweighing noise is therefore a simple means for
subjects to model the lack of trust in predecessors’ actions, without implying a definitive or systematic
direction of the error. Traders thus act as if the proportion of noise traders were higher than 25% by
downgrading the quality of information extracted from the history of actions embodied in Ht−1 or qt.
Finally, since we already have noise traders built into the experiment, by opting to allow traders to
increase their estimates of the percentage of expected noise trades above 25% our method is arguably
an especially simple and intuitive rule of thumb which enables subjects to incorporate naive reasoning
on the part of their peers. For more on rules of thumb by laboratory subjects in a herding context see
Ivanov, Levin, and Peck (2009).
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since the results did not differ, we choose not to report them here in detail.38
Several studies (Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino
(2005)) have already identified that when prices grow, people with high signals tend to
act as contrarians, i.e. they sell. There are multiple possible explanations, ranging from
risk aversion (which we refute) to slow or no updating. We observe the same kind of
end-point behavior by the S3 types as in these previous studies. Symmetrically, the S1
types should exhibit similar behavior when prices approach the lower bound. Yet our data
rarely involves prices that fall to a sufficient extent to allow examination of the symmetric
claim. Note that the endpoint effect should also influence the S2 types, because whatever
mechanism or cognitive bias leads S3 types to sell for high prices should apply in the same
manner to S2 types.
Irrespective of which hypothesis is correct, if the end result is observationally equiva-
lent to slow updating then this has a profound effect on how much herding or contrarian
behavior one might expect to see: when people update slowly, it takes longer for them to
reach a (subjective) expectation for which they would herd. However, with slow updating,
they will also be slower to reduce prices and thus it is conceivable that they herd when
prices move (in the short-run) “against” the herd. If indeed people do update slower then
we should observe three things:
(1) In treatment 2, with an increasing information structure, when prices rise, the S2
should start (contrarian) selling at prices before the S3 types. In the data we do in fact
observe that a much larger fraction of S2 act as contrarians than S3.
(2) We should see more irrational herding by S2 types than S1 types in treatment 4
with a decreasing information structure. In the data, while we do observe less irrational
herding by S2 types than S1 types, the difference is minor.
(3) In the hill-shaped information structure treatments (1 and 6), herding should not
arise. In our data we observe that 19% or 13% (respectively) of trades are herd trades
(compared, for example, to 14% for treatment 3 under U-shaped negative information).
In general therefore, there is not enough evidence of slow updating over and above the
benchmark rational theory to allow us to support it as a general description of subject
behavior. In conclusion and to summarize the various findings in this section, we feel that
the variations and behavioral alternatives to the benchmark model of Bayesian rationality
which we have considered do not provide sufficient improvement in fit to allow us to
support Hypotheses 6 to 9. We should emphasize the positive nature of these findings,
since it reinforces the relative success of the rational model in describing the data, which
was the key insight of rational herding theory from its earliest incarnations: to provide a
rational explanation of apparently irrational phenomena.
38For example, we considered whether traders chase short-term trends, but found that they do not.
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C Time-line
What follows is a precise chronological ordering of events during the experiment.
1. The room is prepared and software pre-loaded into the machines to be used, which
are allocated each to one ID number.
2. Read instructions 1 including random distribution of ID cards and seat subjects on
the basis of the allocated ID cards.
3. Read instructions 2 including the completion and collection of permission forms.
4. Read instructions 3 which explains the experimental setting.
5. Read instructions 4 which explains the software.
6. Read instructions 5 which explains the compensation.
7. Read instructions 6 which explains the information setting.
8. Read instructions 7 which summarizes the instructions and pause to answer any
questions.
9. Run treatment 1 (the example round).
10. Pause to answer final questions.
11. Run treatments 2-7.
12. Read instructions 8, which ends the experiment.
13. Calculate and distribute payments while participants complete receipts and ques-
tionnaires.
D Instructions
Note that the parts of the instructions in bold indicate that a name, number or currency
be included in the instructions which vary by session. Words in italics are emphasized.
and pause to answer any questions. The instructions are long, and the pre-experimental
instructions (1-7) took an average of around 25 minutes to deliver including typical ques-
tions. Payment calculations typically took around 5 minutes during which subjects were
asked to shut down open software and complete a questionnaire.
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Instructions 1 (Welcome)
Welcome to everyone participating in today’s experiment. My name is [name] and my
assistants for today will be [names]. The experiment should take around one and half
to two hours and will mainly involve using a computer. I ask that for the entirety of the
experiment you refrain from talking unless you wish to ask a clarifying question or point
out a computer error to me or one of my assistants, and you will be told when you can and
cannot ask questions. You will be paid a turn up fee of £5 [equivalent in Canadian
dollars] and can earn anything up to a further £25 [equivalent in Canadian dollars]
based on your performance, so try to do your best! I will now distribute your ID cards.
Please keep these safe as they not only determine where you will sit, but also what your
payments will be. Actions during this experiment are anonymous in the sense that we are
aware only of your ID number as indicated on your ID card when calculating payments
and not your names. Please could you now take a seat in front of the computer indicated
by your ID number. The computers are all divided by large screens for a reason, so please
do not attempt to examine other people’s computers.
Instructions 2 (After Seated)
After taking a seat make sure you are using the computer that is appropriate for your
ID number. You will notice that there is a graph displayed on the screen with several
on-screen buttons which are currently not highlighted. Next please read and sign the
permission form using the pen provided. The permission form confirms that you have
given permission for us to use you as willing participants in this experiment. You will also
need to complete a receipt which you will be given at the end of the experiment before
your receive your payment. My assistant(s) and I will now collect your permission forms.
Instructions 3 (The Experimental Setting)
Next I will describe the experiment itself. You will be participating in a series of financial
market trading exercises. There will be 7 trading rounds, and each round will last 3-4
minutes. There are [number of participants] participants in the room and everyone
is involved in the same trading exercise. Your objective should be to take the most
thorough decision possible in order to maximize the money you will make today. The
general situation is the following: you are the stockholder of a company and have some
cash in hand. Some event may happen to your company that affects the value of the
company (for better or worse). You have a broker who provides you with his best guess.
You then have to decide whether you want to buy an additional share of the company,
whether you want to sell your share, or whether you want to do nothing. We will look at a
variety of similar situations: each situation concerns a different company, and we will vary
the information and the trading rules in each situation. Please note that the situation
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described to you in each round is independent of that in any other round. In other
words, what you learned in round 1 tells you nothing about round 2, etc. In the process
of this session you may or may not generate virtual profits. Your trading activities will
be recorded automatically; these activities determine your trading profits.
Before each round starts, you are given one share of the company and you have suffi-
cient cash to buy a share. Round 1 will be an example round and your final payment will
not reflect how you perform during this round.
During the rounds you may sell your share, you may buy one additional share or you
may do nothing. You can only trade within a specific time window indicated by the
software a red blinking bar appearing around the trading buttons below the graph. You
will receive a notification by the system on your screen and then you have 5 seconds to
make your trade. The frantic blinking will continue for 5 seconds irrespective of whether
you trade or not. Note that you can trade only once, in other words, you can only buy or
sell, you cannot do both. Once you have hit the button it may take the system a second
or two to register your trade. You should not double-click or attempt to click more than
once.
There will be a pause after round 1, the example round, when you can answer ques-
tions. During rounds 2-7 you will be required to remain silent.
Instructions 4 (The Software)
Now please examine your computer screen, without hitting any buttons. Before you is a
screen that contains several pieces of information:
1. It tells you about all the trades that occur during the round; you also see when a
trade occurs and whether or not someone bought or sold a share. For your conve-
nience, there is a graph that plots the sequence of prices.
2. Your screen also lists the current market price; people can either buy a share at this
price or they can sell their share at this price.
3. In the case where we restrict the time when you can make a trade, a red bar will
appear on the bottom of the screen to highlight the fact that you can trade. During
this time the buy, sell and pass buttons will be available for your use, typically only
once per round, though twice in the final 3 rounds.
4. There is also a box in which you receive some information from your ”broker” which
I will explain in a few moments.
5. The screen includes a timer which indicates how many seconds have gone past during
the round.
6. Finally, the screen updates itself whenever a trade is made.
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Note that you are not directly interacting with any of the other participants in the
experiment, rather the actions of all of the traders including you and your fellow partici-
pants will effect the current price which is set by the central computer being operated at
the front of the experimental laboratory such that a decision to purchase by a trader will
raise price and to sell will lower it. This central computer will also be producing trades
itself which will account for 25% of all the possible trades during each round and will be
determined randomly so there is a 50% chance a computer trader will buy and a 50%
chance he will sell.
Instructions 5 (Compensation)
Next I will describe the payment you will receive. You will receive £5 [Canadian equiv-
alent] in cash for showing up today. You can add to that up to a further £25 [Canadian
equivalent] as a bonus payment. In this trading experiment, you will be buying or sell-
ing a share (with virtual units of a virtual currency), and this trading may or may not
lead to virtual profits. Your bonus payment depends on how much profit you generate in
total across all of the rounds with the exception of the example round. In general, the
more thorough your decisions are, the greater are your chances of making profits, and the
higher will be your bonus.
I will next explain virtual profits. When you trade you will do so at a the current price
appearing on your computer screen. The initial price is 100 virtual currency units (vcu).
This price changes based upon the trading that goes on during the round including those
by your fellow participants and the random computer traders. While you will trade today
during the experiment, we can imagine that after the end of each round of trading there
is a second day during which the event (good, bad or neutral) is realized and the price
of the share is updated to reflect this: this will be either 75, 100 or 125 vcu. To stress,
which price is realized depends upon which event takes place:
• if something good happens to the company, the price will be 125 after the realization
of the event;
• if something bad happens, so the price will be 75;
• if neither of these, so the price reverts to the initial value of 100.
Your profit relates to the difference between the current price that you buy or sell a
share at today, and the price revealed after the event takes place. An example of a good
event happening to the company might be that it wins a court case or gains a patent. A
bad thing might be the opposite, so the firm loses a court case or fails to gain a patent.
Note that as already stressed, each round is an independent experiment, so in round 1 it
may be that the bad event takes place so the share price becomes 75 after trading finishes,
while in round 2 it may be worth 125, etc.
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Next I will go through some simple numerical examples of what might happen.
Example 1 If you buy a share at a price of 90 vcu, and after the event takes place the
price of the share is updated to 125 vcu. You have therefore made 35 vcu of virtual profits
on your trade. If you instead sold at 90 vcu you would have lost 35 vcu. If you did nothing
you would make a profit of 25 vcu since your share was originally worth 100 vcu and is
worth 125 vcu after the event is realized.
Example 2 If you buy a share at a price of 110 vcu, and after the event takes place the
price of the share is updated to 100 vcu you have lost 10 vcu of virtual profits on your
trade. If you instead sold at 110 vcu you would have made 10 vcu. If you did nothing you
would have neither made a profit or a loss on your trade.
So note that what matters is the price when you take an action and the true value after
the good, bad or neutral event. Which event occurs will not be revealed to you during the
experiment though you will receive information about which is more likely before the start
of trading. I will explain the nature of this information in a moment.
Please remember that each round represents a completely different situation with a
different share and a different firm. In every round you may make or lose virtual profits
and by the end the central computer will have a complete record of your performance.
On the basis of your overall performance the central computer will calculate your bonus
payment.
Instructions 6 (The Information Setting)
I will now explain the broker’s tip and the information you have before each round begins.
Next to your computer is a set of sheets which correspond to each round. For example,
the top sheet is called ”Example Round 1”, and has several pieces of information about
the share. For instance the sheet indicates to you the chance that the share price will
be 75, 100 or 125 vcu after the event. Next it indicates what sort of broker’s tips you
might receive. Each participant has identical sheets, the text, numbers and diagrams are
literally the same for every participant.
Your broker will give you a tip via your computer screen that indicates his view about
what sort of event will occur. He might give you a ”good tip” (which we call S3), ”bad
tip” (S1) or ”middle tip” (S2). A good S3 tip indicates that he believes the event will be
good and the share price will be 125 vcu after it is realized, a bad S1 tip that something
bad will happen indicates 75 after the event is realized. A middle S2 tip is a bit more
complex but indicates he feels 100 vcu is his best guess:
• It could mean that he believes nothing at all will happen hence he believes the price
will revert to the original 100 vcu and we call this case 1.
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• Or it could mean that he believes an event will happen but he is not sure whether
it is either good or bad, and we call this case 2.
• Or it could mean that he believes something good or bad will happen and he has
a feel for which, but he is not sufficiently sure to indicate the good or bad tip and
would prefer to indicate middle and we call this case 3.
Before each round you are told which case would apply if you receive a middle signal
together with a background probability that there will be a good, neutral or bad event
which will make tomorrow’s price 75, 100 or 125 respectively.
Unlike the contents of the information sheet the tip you receive is private to you, and
other participants may receive the same or a different tip. In other words it is possible
that your broker might believe a good event is going to happen so the price will be 125
after this realization, while other participants might have brokers who agree or disagree
with your broker’s tip. There are also other pieces of information on the sheet including
the probability that the broker is correct when he gives you a tip, and this probability is
the same for all participants.
You will be given 2 minutes to examine the relevant sheet before each round. You will
then receive notification on your computer screen of the actual tip sent to you from the
broker: S1, S2 or S3, and will have another minute to consider this. The beginning of
the round will then be announced and trading will begin. Remember you can only trade
during the 5 second window indicated by a red bar on your screen. The buttons on the
screen (buy, sell or pass) can only be pressed during this time and only once per round.
Instructions 7 (Summary)
To summarize, you are in a market experiment with a central computer that both records
your actions and produces random trades (which account for 25% of all trades). All other
participants will also have the opportunity to trade. You will receive a private signal from
a broker and other information pertaining to the price of the share after a possible event
occurs, including the likelihood of the broker being correct. The information on your
information sheet is common to everyone (for example, everyone’s broker is just as likely
to be correct as yours), but the broker’s signal is private to you while others will receive a
signal which may be the same or different from yours. Each market participant, yourself
included, has their own different broker in each round. The rounds are all different in the
sense that the share is for a different company, the broker is different and earlier actions
and prices are not relevant. You will make virtual profits based on the difference between
your trading price in vcu and the price after the event which will be 75, 100 or 125 vcu.
The total of your virtual profits across all rounds, excluding the example round, will be
used to calculate your bonus payment. To maximize your bonus payment you will then
have to make high virtual profits and therefore make as thorough a decision as you can.
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Please do not talk, signal or make noises to other participants, please do not show
anyone your screen or discuss your information, please do not try to look at other people’s
screens and we would appreciate if would not leave the room until the experiment is over.
You may ask questions now or just after the example round. Once we begin rounds
2-7 you will not be allowed to ask clarifying questions, though you should inform us if
there is a software problem.
Instructions 8 (Experiment End)
Many thanks for participating in today’s experiment. Please remain in your seats for a
minute or two while I use the central computer to calculate your final payments. I ask that
you close the trading software and any other open software and shut down your computer.
I also ask that you leave the pen and all sheets on your desks, and keep only the ID card
which you will need to bring with you to the front desk in order to receive your payment.
When you receive your payment you will also be asked to complete and sign a receipt. It
would be useful if you could complete the questionnaire that is on your desk, and hand
it in as you leave, though this is not compulsory. After you leave, we ask that you try to
avoid any discussion of this experiment with any other potential participants, and once
again many thanks for your participation.
E Questionnaire
Many thanks for taking part in today’s experiment. The official part of the experiment
is now over. Your payments are now being worked out and you will be paid based on
your ID number (the computer you are using). Please answer the following questions. In
particular this will help us to make future experiments better and may help us understand
the results.
About you
1. Your age:
2. Your gender:
3. Your degree subject:
4. Have you ever owned shares?
5. Do you have any experience of financial markets? (if so, what are your experiences)
About your decisions today
6. What made you decide to buy, sell or pass?
7. How important was the current price?
8. How important was the past price data (the graph)?
9. How important was your “broker’s tip”?
10. What else mattered?
50
11. Did you make any calculations? If so, which ones?
About the experiment
12. Anything else you would like to report, including how to make the experiment better,
can be done so here:
F The Software
The trading market was simulated through a software engine, run on a central computer,
networked to a number of client machines each running the one version of the client
for each subject. The central computer acted to record and analyze results, as well as
to distribute signals (through an administrator application) and provide a continuously
updated price chart for subjects. The sequence of signals and noise trades was pre-
specified and the computer also organized the allocations of time-slots for each trader and
noise trades and it provided an indication to traders of when they could trade.
Figure 6 shows the administrator software. The screen shot is not taken from an actual
session, but simply shows the layout on screen for a fictional session. It is currently listed
as recording the activity of traders in “Treatment 1”. As can be seen in the figure there
are more noise traders than would be normal in an actual session (indicated by the final
letter N, whereas subjects are indicated by a final ID number). As can be seen here trader
HEG5P3 has “timed out” (failed to act in their 5 second window).
The client software provided a simple to use graphical interface which enabled subjects
to observe private information (their signal), and public information (the movement of
prices and the current price), as well as indicating to them when they could trade (flashing
red and enabling trading buttons) and providing the means of trade (buy, sell and pass
buttons). Figure 7 below shows a screen shot of the software in action.
Here you can see that the price initially rose from a level of 100, indicating buying at
the early stages, but then price started to fall back, it rallied and then fell back further
to a value of around 116. This subject’s private signal was S1 (low) and the subject had
a single share to sell and a large cash balance to enable him to buy a further share. He
could also pass (declining to buy or sell) when he was given the opportunity to trade.
The software was custom-programmed for the experiment, as existing software mimics
order driven markets in which traders submit both limit and market orders.39
39Further details about the software are available on request from the authors.
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Table 7
Risk-Aversion Analysis.
The table classifies trades as wrong assuming that traders took the decisions according to an underlying model that admitted risk-averse behavior. The
first set of columns looks at the case with constant relative risk aversion utility (or power utility; we obtained the best fit for the log-utility function).
The second set of columns looks at the case of constant absolute risk aversion (or exponential utility); while the fit for risk aversion parameter ρ = 1 is
not the best, it is indicative. As ρ decreases so that we approach risk neutrality, the fit improves and it is bounded above by the fit of the risk neutral
model. The total number of decisions is in Table 4 from the main text.
Total Number of
wrong decisions
CRRA utility,
γ = 1 (log-utility)
Total Number of
wrong decisions
CARA utility,
ρ = 1
Total Number of
wrong decisions
CARA utility,
ρ = 0.01
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill shape 18 58 37 46 60 14 46 58 48
33% 58% 51% 84% 60% 19% 84% 58% 67%
Treatment 2 increasing 31 60 36 60 28 10 60 30 50
42% 67% 53% 81% 31% 15% 81% 33% 74%
Treatment 3 negative U shape 13 69 37 48 59 6 48 18 61
22% 73% 49% 82% 63% 8% 82% 19% 80%
Treatment 4 decreasing 32 41 33 44 74 6 44 75 65
57% 41% 45% 76% 75% 8% 76% 76% 88%
Treatment 5 positive U shape 29 66 32 58 29 7 58 25 55
43% 67% 49% 86% 30% 11% 86% 26% 85%
Treatment 6 negative hill shape 41 51 22 66 42 6 66 47 52
47% 61% 38% 76% 51% 10% 76% 57% 90%
Total number wrong 164 345 197 322 292 49 322 253 331
percentage wrong 41% 61% 48% 70% 44% 10% 70% 39% 68%
Total model fit 48.8% 41.3% 56.5%
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Table 8
Loss-Aversion Analysis.
The table classifies trades as right or wrong assuming that traders took the decisions according to an underlying model that admitted a loss-averse
valuation function as depicted in Section B.1.3. The two sets of columns depict popular specifications for the Kahneman and Tversky parameters α, β, γ.
As can be seen, the fit is much lower than with the rational, risk-neutral model. We also tried many different parametric configurations but could not
provide a higher fit. The structure of the table is similar to that of Table 7.
Total Number of
wrong decisions
prospect theory,
α = β = 0.8, γ = 1
Total Number of
wrong decisions
prospect theory,
α = β = 0.8, γ = 2.25
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill shape 20 81 37 22 82 37
36% 81% 51% 40% 82% 51%
Treatment 2 increasing 31 57 36 31 71 57
42% 63% 53% 42% 79% 84%
Treatment 3 negative U shape 21 69 37 21 68 67
35% 73% 49% 35% 72% 88%
Treatment 4 decreasing 41 55 33 40 55 48
71% 56% 45% 71% 56% 86%
Treatment 5 positive U shape 32 70 32 32 73 46
48% 71% 49% 48% 74% 71%
Treatment 6 negative hill shape 41 59 22 41 59 22
47% 71% 38% 47% 71% 38%
Total number wrong 185 391 197 187 408 277
wrong percentage 46% 69% 48% 47% 72% 67%
Total model fit 43.8% 36.7%
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Table 9
Probability Scaling.
The table lists the results from comparing the decisions taken with those that would be optimal under the hypothesis that traders rescale and overweight
their prior as depicted in Subsection B.1.4. The structure of the table is similar to that in Table 4 with correct and wrong actions listed alongside one
another.
With α = 5 With α = 10 With α = 25
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill shape 46 61 57 46 61 57 46 61 57
7 37 14 7 37 14 7 37 14
87% 62% 80% 87% 62% 80% 87% 62% 80%
Treatment 2 increasing 60 56 57 60 56 57 60 56 57
10 28 10 10 28 10 10 28 10
86% 67% 85% 86% 67% 85% 86% 67% 85%
Treatment 3 negative U shape 48 31 68 48 41 68 48 57 68
10 62 6 10 52 6 10 36 6
83% 33% 92% 83% 44% 92% 83% 61% 92%
Treatment 4 decreasing 44 73 65 44 73 65 44 73 65
12 25 6 12 25 6 12 25 6
77% 74% 92% 77% 74% 92% 77% 74% 92%
Treatment 5 positive U shape 58 66 56 58 66 56 58 66 56
9 29 7 9 29 7 9 29 7
87% 69% 89% 87% 69% 89% 87% 69% 89%
Treatment 6 negative hill shape 66 60 52 66 60 52 66 60 52
20 22 6 20 22 6 20 22 6
77% 73% 90% 77% 73% 90% 77% 73% 90%
Total trades in line with probability scaling 322 347 355 322 357 355 322 373 355
Percentage explained 84% 64% 88% 84% 66% 88% 84% 69% 88%
Total model fit 77.1% 77.9% 79.1%
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Table 10
Error Correction Provisions.
The table lists the results from comparing the decisions taken with those that would be optimal under the hypothesis that traders correct for the possibly
of random actions by their peers as depicted in Subsection B.1.5. The first two sets of columns look at the situation in which a certain fraction takes a
random action; this can also be understood as an overweighing of the extent of noise trading. The third set of columns considers the possibility that the
fraction of traders that does not act irrationally reacts rationally to the irrationality of the remaining players. The structure of the table is similar to
that in Table 4 with correct and wrong actions listed alongside one another.
simple noise shift simple noise shift Level 2 noise shift
δ = 2/3 δ = 1/3 δ = .24
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill shape 46 62 46 46 61 47 46 63 46
7 36 25 7 37 24 7 35 25
87% 63% 65% 87% 62% 66% 84% 63% 64%
Treatment 2 increasing 60 35 50 60 38 49 60 36 49
10 49 17 10 46 18 10 48 18
86% 42% 75% 86% 45% 73% 81% 40% 72%
Treatment 3 negative U shape 48 35 57 48 59 55 48 59 58
10 59 17 10 35 19 10 35 16
83% 37% 77% 83% 63% 74% 82% 63% 76%
Treatment 4 decreasing 43 74 64 43 74 65 44 74 65
13 25 10 13 25 9 12 25 9
75% 75% 86% 75% 75% 88% 76% 75% 88%
Treatment 5 positive U shape 58 38 55 58 44 55 58 42 55
9 57 8 9 51 8 9 53 8
87% 40% 87% 87% 46% 87% 86% 43% 85%
Treatment 6 negative hill shape 66 49 52 66 48 49 66 49 49
20 33 6 20 34 9 20 33 9
77% 60% 90% 77% 59% 84% 76% 60% 84%
Total identified 321 293 324 321 324 320 325 324 322
Total fit 84% 54% 81% 84% 59% 80% 82% 59% 79%
Total model fit 69.5% 71.5% 71.7%
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Signals: Case 2 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is an effect but he is not sure which one; he is leaning towards positive. 
If the true effect will be POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 30% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 65% 
If the true effect will be NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 70% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect will be NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 45% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 10% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 45% 
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Signals: Case 2 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is an effect but he is not sure which one; he is leaning towards negative. 
If the true effect will be POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 70% 
If the true effect will be NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 65% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 30% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect will be NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 45% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 10% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 45% 
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Signals: Case 1 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is no effect.
If the true effect will be POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 70% 
If the true effect will be NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 65% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 30% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect will be NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 10% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 80% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 10% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
negative impact no impact positive impact
low signal middle signal high signal
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
low signal middle signal high signal
negative impact no impact positive impact
F
ig
u
re
3
In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
S
h
e
e
t
fo
r
n
e
g
a
tiv
e
h
ill
sh
a
p
e
58
Round
Signals: Case 3 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is a positive effect but he is not confident enough to give the good signal. 
If the true effect will be POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 35% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 60% 
If the true effect will be NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 80% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 15% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect will be NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 35% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 40% 
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Signals: Case 3 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is a negative effect but he is not confident enough to give the good signal. 
If the true effect will be POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 15% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 80% 
If the true effect will be NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 60% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 35% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect will be NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 40% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 35% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
negative impact no impact positive impact
low signal middle signal high signal
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
low signal middle signal high signal
negative impact no impact positive impact
F
ig
u
re
5
In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
S
h
e
e
t
fo
r
d
e
c
re
a
sin
g
c
sd
60
Figure 6
The Administrative Interface
Figure 7
The Trading Client
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